

## Our North is the South: International Cooperation for Development within the Lusophone Sphere

Mayra Goulart e Patrícia Rangel

### Mayra Goulart

is a Associate Professor of Political Theory and International Politics at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro [*Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro*] E-mail: mayragoulart@gmail.com

### Patrícia Rangel

holds a FAPESP postdoctoral scholarship at the School of Philosophy, Literature and Human Sciences [*Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas*] of the University of São Paulo [*Universidade de São Paulo*]. E-mail: pdrangel@gmail.com

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### Abstract

The central hypothesis of the research here presented, regarding cooperation initiatives with developing countries — in particular with African Countries of Portuguese Official Language (Palops), implies the recognition that although its origin corresponds to a previous process, it is since the Labor Party (PT) electoral rise in Brazil that such initiatives acquire a new intensity, whose dimension allows conceiving them as a rupture. The purpose of understanding Brazilian foreign policy changes as a paradigm change, thus, configures an approach to understand the approximation movement towards developing countries that does not become a hostage to the pragmatism versus ideology dichotomy. In order to underpin that thesis, this article is divided in three sections. At first we develop some reflections on modernization, development and national interest, relating these ideas to the constitution of Brazilian foreign policy traditions throughout the 20th century. In the second section, in turn, we deal with the concept of International Development Cooperation (IDC), approaching its historical genesis and main implications. We will then analyze the Brazilian case, addressing cooperation and partnership initiatives aiming to establish closer relations with Global South countries. To this extent, having the political changes occurred in South America during the early 21st as backdrop, we will present the notions of Solidarity Diplomacy and Responsible Pragmatism as guidelines that structure a new Brazilian Foreign Policy approach. Finally, as an offshoot of this new perspective, some results of the partnership dynamic established between Brazil and Portuguese-speaking countries of the Global South will be presented in the last section.

### Keywords

Brazilian Foreign Policy; International Development Cooperation (IDC); Lusophony; African Countries of Portuguese Official Language.

## Introduction

In recent years, there has been a good deal of discussion in International Relations field about a change in Brazilian Foreign Policy paradigm which has been giving increasing importance to bilateral and multilateral relations with the Global South. Whereas the 1990s represented a return to the tradition of the bilateral hemisphere, the 21st Century has witnessed a demand to follow the global-multilateral tradition. In terms of foreign policy, this has resulted in a convergence of the bilateral and multilateral realms with an emphasis on broadening and combining horizontal and vertical dimensions of strategic partners. The incorporation of Brazil in the International System at the end of the Cold War raised questions about the dichotomy between these two trends in foreign policy (PECEQUILO, 2008).

Running parallel with this, the concept of *Lusophonia* is increasingly being discussed, due to the initiatives being carried out to strengthen relations between Nation States whose official language is Portuguese. Lusophonia is a concept that embraces the whole population that uses the Portuguese language – consisting of approximately 250 million people (GRAÇA apud PEREIRA, 2011) – and which at the same time refers to “a cultural reality comprising a set of peoples and lands united by historical ties” (PEREIRA, 2011:18). It is a spatial-territorial reality, which corresponds to a group of eight countries where the official language is Portuguese (Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and East Timor), as well as Macau<sup>1</sup>.

The purpose of this article is to examine initiatives of cooperation and partnership between Brazil and the African countries with Portuguese as their official language (PALOPS). However, the research conducted with this aim was undertaken on the basis of a definition where politics is regarded as the sphere for the pooling of interests and formation of a *general* collective will. Hence, this definition refers to the creation of collective identities which can serve as a benchmark-based (or ideological) parameter to determine (factual or pragmatic) strategies in pursuit of these interests. From this standpoint, politics – or in the terminology used by the authors drawn on below, *the policy* – is viewed as a process of *creating* and not *expressing* a collective will, since it is in the definition of identities, and not as a simple record of pre-existing interests, that it plays a crucial role (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 1985:17).

If this is taken into account, the aim of the argument here is to conduct a criticism of the approaches which analyze foreign or domestic policy on the basis of a dichotomy between pragmatism and ideology, facticity and validity. Thus this line of argument condemns those analysis who fail to take note of the factors that bind together the strategic and evaluative features, and to argue that both can be found in the dynamics of identity-formation. From this standpoint, as underlined in the passage that follows, they should be engaged in merging and defining the values and strategies that must be pursued to achieve a determined collective policy, by creating something that can be understood as identity or

the *national interest*, since power relations is taken into account in its configuration.

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Power, as Ernesto Laclau indicates, should not be conceived as an external relationship taking place between two preconstituted identities because it is power that constitutes the identities themselves. According to him, systems of social organization can be seen as attempts to reduce the margin of undecidability to make way for actions and decisions that are as coherent as possible<sup>2</sup> (MOUFFE, 1993:141).

In light of this, an understanding of the climate where these distinct concepts of foreign policy are formed (as manifested throughout our recent history), require that special attention be given to the resignification of identity, which is responsible for what we understand as *national interest*. For this reason, an understanding of the present scenery – in which nationalism and "developmentalism" of the past are given a new meaning, should allow a new concept of *national interest* to emerge. That entails making a decision to form solidarity with the "excluded" – and which requires a brief exegesis of some of the preceding processes.

As explained earlier, although they are not synonyms, the terms *Lusophonia*, *The Lusophone Community and Lusophone Space*<sup>5</sup> are employed here to refer to peoples of lusophone character and speakers of Portuguese, in particular the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP)<sup>4</sup>. This is a plural community characterized by diversity while at the same time being united by a common factor (the language), and which can be interpreted as a "forum for the meeting and intersection of lusophonic cultures" (SANTOS, 2005) and as the institutionalized expression of this lusophone world.

This article is divided into three sections in which discussions are carried out that are distinct but interrelated. In the first stage, there are some reflections about modernization and development, where the idea of national interest is discussed, by renewing the project of modernization and development (with a stress on "national-developmentalism") and relating it to the traditions of Brazilian foreign policy throughout the 20th Century. The second stage will address international changes that occurred at the turn of the century, together with the initiatives of international cooperation, in particular the links between International Cooperation and Development.

Following this, there will be an analysis of the Brazilian case, where there have been initiatives of cooperation in support of strengthening ties with other countries in the Global South. In addition, there has been the development of the diplomacy of solidarity and the notion of *Responsible Pragmatism*, as a backcloth to political changes in Brazil and South America, which have been made possible by the "red tidal wave" that erupted at the beginning of this century. As a natural ramification, the final section is devoted to strategies of solidarity between Brazil and the lusophone countries of the Global South. In the "final considerations" section, it is suggested that in a new paradigm, domestic and foreign policies can be defined as the values and strategies that are interspersed with the power relations; these can be understood and summed up as the *national interest*.

### **1. Modernization, Development and Foreign Policy**

Although delineated throughout the period of colonization and the first stages of our republican history (the Old Republic), the idea of the nation began to be a key feature of the discussions and identity of different groups who lived here after the Revolution of 1930, and then became the core of a political project of the elite who used it to seize

power. Among other factors, this renewal of the governing class, which occurred at roughly the same time in other Latin American countries, was less controlled by the North American elite, who previously had assisted those committed to preserve its interests to rise to power and remain there. The reason for this was the distraction of the two world wars, which broke out within a short period of time.

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Until then the United States, the main player in the South American continent had been governed by the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which was mainly designed to ensure that the country dominated the region through the support of the local elites who were committed to its interests. Ultimately it was these elites that were responsible for renewing the colonial pact which was now updated in a context of independence in which the Latin American States would play the role of the consumer market and supplier of raw materials for the rapidly expanding North American industry. This perspective, which was adopted by the national elites (the agro-exporters), helps us to understand the foreign policy of that time that was characterized by an automatic and unconditional alignment with the dominant power. It was a trend that ran parallel with the international scene, and from the 1930s onwards, shaped the "dynamics of differentiation", which could be found at the heart of the Brazilian economic elite, and saw the rise of new players committed to the interests of industry.

The idea of the *national interest*, shaped the rise of a new political elite in the country that claimed to represent a general public will; this went beyond the dichotomy that existed between the elites and those who belonged to the working-class. Thus the national-populist project was defined in terms of a wish to carry out the modernization of the country by means of a pact that was able to involve the whole of society. This was in turn structured on corporate identities, the convergence of which would be stimulated and guaranteed by the pedagogical and coercive activities of a State that (it was assumed) was a rational entity able to cater for the national interest and finance the ideal of development that it reflected.

At first this *modernizing dream* found its counterpart in an international climate (still scarred by the 1st and 2nd World Wars), which allowed it to make some progress in strategies of industrialization. These involved replacing imports (as a result of lower competition) with the products of developed countries, whose productive structures had been committed to the manufacture of military weapons. However, in the aftermath of the 2nd World War, the economy of the "central" countries underwent a period of recovery, which reduced the scope of the marginal countries whose development was still in its early stages. Within these countries, this crisis was aggravated by disputes between the industrial elite and the agro-exporters who were operating with the aid of subsidies from the State. This was because the industrial sector which experienced difficulties in competing with the products of the "central" countries, put pressure on the State to meet its demands for financial resources and better facilities.

The result was a dynamic that involved the undermining of the *national-populist* model as a development strategy for replacing imports financed by the Treasury Department. This dynamic, accelerated after the Cuban Revolution (1959) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1963), in so far as the recrudescence of the Cold War made it difficult to take steps to bring about reconciliation between the classes. This meant that disputes became radicalized and there was an increase of pressure on the State, which began to experience difficulties in carrying out its shifting strategies. Finally, this led to a disruption of the

alliances that supported the national-populist model, which culminated in a military coup that put a political elite in power that was less committed to the forces of reconciliation and bargaining, especially with regard to the working-classes.

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Since they were committed to a policy of modernization, which involved bringing about industrialization through a system of substituting imports, the new political players sought to make this viable by resorting to international loans. The new occupants of the State, which replaced Getúlio Vargas after his political decline and subsequent suicide, benefited from an external climate of economic liquidity. In addition, they were assisted by the availability of military hardware and financial support on the part of the great power in the hemisphere – which wanted to maintain a political elite committed to controlling the general public and repressing any measures that might question the capitalist mode of production.

Nonetheless, in a general way, it was the unrestrained support of the US added to the huge loans made possible by a propitious international economic environment (it was a time of low interest rates), that were the factors responsible for the relative success of the *national-developmental* model. For this reason, on account of the particularly favorable external conditions, the Brazilian State could cater for the interests of the agrarian and industrial elites and (to a lesser extent) the workers, whose living standards underwent a slight improvement in the period of growth (the period of the “economic miracle”).

This model, in the same way as the previous one, can be defined by an ideal of modernization, understood on the basis of concepts of development and the nation, which explains its designation as *national-developmental*. However, it is worth noting that the “resignification of identity”, that is responsible for the transition from the previous model, entails a new understanding of the notion of *national interest*. It ceases to be understood as a common good or the (general) will of a macro-subject (the people), but can rather be regarded as the sum of individuals who are united by an *invisible hand*. But for all this, this notion is not corroborated by a discourse on the reduction of State capabilities, or an emphasis on the market and social actors. Thus, the national-developmentalism that Brazil espoused until the period of redemocratization, became the protagonist and centralizing force, although it reduced corporatism to a mechanism of “pure coercion, that ceased to exercise the functions of a conduit between the State and the trade unions or the exercise of a civic engagement pedagogy for a citizenship geared to the common good, as was originally conceived in 1930” (VIANNA and RESENDE DE CARVALHO, 2000: 27).

In the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, this discourse in favor of the reduction of the State, became hegemonic following a widespread perspective about the weakness of economic planning initiatives – whether in the revolutionary aspects of a socialism that really exists or in its less radical offshoots, like the Welfare State. As a result, a consensus seems to have emerged about the need to reduce regulatory bodies and distribution since they are curbing the free activities of individual interests, the freedom of which has given rise to long-lasting growth and development by disrupting the cycle of stagnation and backwardness. Running parallel with this, with the easing of the Cold War, there was less need for the United States to maintain governments committed to keeping an ideological alliance with capitalism. This led to a reduction of support for authoritarian strategies of repression that until then, had resulted in the persecution of all social movements that were liable to be identified with the working-class.

This background triggered the crisis of the national developmentalist model, which at that time was exacerbated by the reduced liquidity of the world economy as a result of what was

known as *oil price shocks*. Following a general increase in interest rates, which were pegged to the huge loans granted to Latin-American governments to support their modernizing strategies, the developmentalist model was undermined and its very legitimacy imploded under the threat of insolvency and the loss of international credibility.

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In the light of this critical situation, the end of the Cold War has been characterized in Latin America by the convergence of two interdependent processes. On the realistic plane, it was linked to a reduction of the need for the hegemonic power to maintain a system of control on the periphery – based on the use of *hard power*, and operated by means of unreservedly interventionist and in some cases authoritarian, policies by nation states. On the evaluative plane, the situation gave rise to discourses in which the State (once regarded as the maker of everything modern) begins to be seen as a brake that curbs the energies of the economic players. These are now believed to be more capable of pursuing the path of development without the intervention of planning strategies.

In the international sphere, the new *episteme* had the image of what was presumed to be a dwindling of the Welfare State, which corresponded to the fact that it had a more limited use in checking the advance of communism. In the national sphere, these discourses were held by civil society in a mood of excitement since the prospect of redemocratization was accompanied by the emergence of leaders who, in political terms, were regarded as being able to preserve international stability and re-establish democracy. With regard to the economy, these political and intellectual classes of the elite were committed to restoring the political and economic credibility of the international community. This would be achieved by means of loans (in particular from the IMF, whose main concern was the reduction of government expenditure and the sale of State assets).

On the other hand, the end of this bipolarity opened up space for measures that could strengthen the required international multipolar system in the evaluative/ideological sphere, through a discourse that laid stress on the role of civil society and non-State players and by necessity, on the factual/strategic sphere, and on the ability of the Brazilian political elite to restore credibility with the international creditors. Thus, the foreign policy undertaken during the period was characterized by a search for a greater role in the forums and organizations that make up this system, as well as by a series of bilateral and regional measures devoted to an increase of commercial, diplomatic and political relations with the developed countries. The success of both undertakings allowed the country to recover its international credibility and as a result, it began to strive for a position as a *significant player* within the global order, which was becoming increasingly multilateral and more accustomed to seeing the emerging countries playing a leading role.

## **2. North X South: International Cooperation for Development as a Strategy and Ideology**

The initiatives taken by the International Cooperation for Development can be defined as a relationship between a donor and recipient which differs from a commercial relationship between salesmen and customers, for its purpose is to encourage structural changes in the productive systems of the recipient countries that are aimed at overcoming possible restrictions or constraints on natural growth. Hence, the programs implemented under its auspices were designed to affect a transfer of knowledge, equipment and examples of successful experiences, with a view to training personnel and strengthening the institutions of the country that received the loans (MILANI, 2012: 18).

As in the case of all political initiatives, the CID brings together evaluative/ideological and strategic/pragmatic factors. In this way, it proclaims moral principles such as social justice and solidarity. At the same, by encouraging capital flows between the countries involved, it draws closer to them and helps promote business and as a result, its degree of influence definitely benefits the donor country. Notwithstanding this, with regard to the question of the dynamics between ideology and pragmatism, there are security analysts who have defined the weight and substance of each of the terms from a theoretical, cultural and political standpoint, as shown in Chart 1.

<b>Chart 1 - Views of the international cooperation for development</b>		
<b>Perspectives</b>	<b>Reasons in favor of cooperation</b>	<b>Skeptical and critical reasons</b>
Micro: - implications for the donor countries and beneficiaries.	Encourages the growth and development of the beneficiary countries (liberal view in a more idealistic dimension).	Growth and development result in endogenous forces that arise from the capacities and resources of different players who can be found in the localities of each nation (Dependence Theory).
Macro: - implications for international politics.	Fosters greater integration (business and economic), peace and prosperity in the relations between the donor and beneficiary countries (institutionalist liberal view). The richer countries have a moral and humanitarian obligation to help the less developed countries (idealistic liberal view).  This leads to the establishment and spread of values and principles (human rights, environmental protection, democracy, gender equality etc.) and the socialization of the States in this sphere (constructivist view).	CID as the interference of States and world governments in the markets, the investment sector, and commerce, which form the basis of the development of nations (ultraliberal view). CID as a more subtle expression of the inequality inherent in the inter-state capitalist system and imperialism, which supports the asymmetrical relationships between the developed and developing countries (Marxist view). Bilateral cooperation as the expression of the interests of the foreign policy of the donor nation, which enables it to shape a strategic policy of domination, alignment, "soft power" or neocolonialism (realistic view).

Source: Milani, 2012, p.217.

As observed above, neo-liberal theories tend to regard cooperative measures as a ramification of the harmful interference of the State on the market, which conditions the relationship between business and investment by disturbing the natural equilibrium and ends up as an obstacle to the real development of the countries involved, as well as their business dealings.

In contrast, theories of Marxist or socialist orientation tend to see CID as both

the expression and means of maintaining the asymmetrical relations that form the international economic system; this inevitably involves imperialist designs (of a fairly subtle kind) on the part of the donor nations. For this reason, these initiatives have served to strengthen the discourses that seek to give legitimacy to the hegemony of the developed countries in the developing world. This entails granting the “center” privileged access to the consumer market, as well as to production (with priority being given to raw materials and products of low added value), while widening the gap that divides the two worlds. Furthermore, the initiatives act as a bargaining chip to ensure support for the strategies carried out by the countries of the North together with multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN).

However, there is a wide range of intermediary positions between those polarized positions, which underline the importance of cooperation and learning, since they might be able to stimulate internal development in a dynamic way by providing qualified labor force and new production techniques or types of technology in a general way. In particular, it should be stressed that there is a need to create mechanisms of control that can make it possible to avoid simply importing resources that are not accompanied by an attempt (albeit in the long term) to organize programs in the recipient countries that are devoted to autonomous production.

This concern to avoid a kind of cooperation that can be viewed as a means of maintaining the asymmetries (or as a kind of conjuring trick involving neo-colonial relations) is a central feature of the discourses that give rise to a new conception of development initiatives. The South-South Cooperation which was established as a result of the closer cultural, economic and political alliance between the developed countries, can be defined<sup>5</sup> through its objective to share experiences, knowledge, skills, competences and resources in furthering the goals of development by concerted action on a bilateral, regional, sub-regional basis<sup>6</sup>.

Thus by employing the definition provided by the Office of the United Nations South-South Cooperation, three basic elements of these initiatives can be cited: (i) the fact that they are organized, managed and put into effect by developing countries; (ii) the leading role played by governments which do not cease to count on the active support of institutions within the public and private sectors, non-governmental organizations and individuals; (iii) the opportunity to include different strategies including the sharing of knowledge and experience, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and contributions in kind.

Although it is impossible to estimate this rise with precision, since it includes a wide range of projects, modalities and perspectives, the origins of the South-South Cooperation can be traced back to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which owes its inspiration to the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955, although it was only founded in 1961 during the Belgrade Conference, when the first NAM meeting took place. With regard to the SSC, its development can be seen in a series of events, among which the following can be cited:

<b>Chart 2: Key events in the development of the SSC</b>	
<b>Year</b>	<b>Event</b>
1949	UN establishes its first program of technical aid.
1955	Recently-independent African and Asian States hold a meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, and decide to work together with the UN as the Afro-Asian group.
1964	The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). At this meeting the Latin-American countries decide to join the African and Asian countries to form the Group of 77.
1965	The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is formed.
1972	The General Assembly of the United Nations sets up a working group for the technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC).
1978	The Buenos Aires Conference is held and its Plan of Action (BAPA) for technical cooperation among developing countries
1992	Establishment of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA).
1996	Re-establishment through a change in terminology of the Unit for South-South Cooperation within the ambit of the United Nations Development Programme..
2000	The General Assembly of the United Nations adopts the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), based on the priorities set out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (Resolution 55/2)..
	A celebration of the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing.
2003/2004	The UN General Assembly, in its Resolution 58/220, declares December 19th, the date when BAPA was ratified, as the Day of the United Nations for the South-South Cooperation. The first Day of the United Nations for the SSC was commemorated in 2004.
	The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum was held in 2003
2005	The Group of Eight (G-8), at a meeting at Gleneagles in Scotland, highlighted the new geography of trade, investment and intellectual relationships and laid stress on the performance of the following: Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Republic of South Korea, South Africa and Thailand. Representatives of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa reached a tacit understanding that the Millennium Development Goals could not be achieved without an increase of South-South interaction.
	Celebration of the Turkey-Africa Cooperation summit.

2009	United Nations SSC Conference held at Nairobi, Kenya. In a document signed at the end of the event, the participants highlighted the role that national governments, regional bodies and UN agencies are playing in supporting and implementing South-South and Triangular Cooperation.
2010	First report issued by Brazil on cooperation for development (prepared by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC).
2011	Founding of the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXID).
2012	Launching of the Brazilian Program for Decentralized South-South Technical Cooperation.
	First stage of the debate among BRICS countries about setting up a development bank (on the initiative of India).

Source: preparation of material based on Milani (2012) and the electronic site of the Office of the United Nations South-South Cooperation.

As illustrated in the Chart above, the desire to change the peripheral and subaltern character of countries from the so-called Third World and ensure their inclusion in the International Economic System, gathered pace after the first half of the 20th Century. At this time many of the States that were largely situated in the Southern Hemisphere, sought to form closer ties with a view to articulating a new global order. However, unlike the relationship that these countries had established with the developed countries, (which in general terms was characterized by verticalization with regard to decision-making and a gain-loss asymmetry) the interaction between the peoples of the South was carried out on the basis of common economic, political and social policies. It also entailed a recognition that there were similar obstacles to being incorporated more fully into the SEI. In noting these resemblances and discerning the possibility of being able to combine forces and overcome the common challenges, they began to formulate a new kind of cooperative initiative, which was characterized by "horizontality" between the partnerships and no longer by the wide gulf that separated the recipients from the donors.

### 3. Brazil: South-South Cooperation and the Diplomacy of Solidarity

In Brazil, some changes could already be seen at the beginning of the 1960s that resulted in closer political and economic ties with the Global South – in particular with African countries, the object of both Brazilian foreign policy and its business ventures. This first move by the Brazilian government to strengthen relations with the countries of the south was dampened down by the recrudescence of the Cold War. As explained above, this took place immediately after the events that culminated in the Cuban Revolution and the Cuba Missiles Crisis and finally the establishment of an authoritarian regime that was unquestionably committed to maintaining the interests of the power of the hemisphere within its country.

In addition, despite the initial commitment, there was a slowing down of the process; however, this did not mean that it had been disrupted. During the Cold War there were some clear signs that the movement of drawing closer to the South had not come to a halt, although it could not be regarded as an area of priority in the guidelines for the foreign

policy of the period. Among these signs, attention can be drawn to the establishment, in 1969, of a public administration framework concerned with international cooperation. It was divided between two institutions: Itamaraty, responsible for formulating strategic policies of cooperation through the Department of Scientific, Technical and Technological Cooperation (DCT), in which the National System of Technical Cooperation can be found. The second is the Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation (Subin)<sup>7</sup>, which had the power to put the projects into effect (LIRA GOES, 2010: 35).

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With regard to Africa, it is worth noting that during the military period, six embassies were opened up on the continent. Moreover, Brazil was the first country to publicly recognize the new government of Angola after its independence, which was led by a Marxist party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). These initiatives led to foreign policy being dubbed with the concept *Responsible Pragmatism*, in particular that carried out during the government of General Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979), by the Foreign Minister, Azeredo da Silva.

However, despite its conceptual inadequacy — since it is structured on a dichotomy between ideological values and pragmatic strategies — the idea of *Responsible Pragmatism* underlines a relationship of continuity for the so-called Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) carried out by Jânio Quadros, San Tiago Dantas and Araujo Castro, which in turn, according to the hegemonic narrative, “came to replace the previous paradigm of Rio Branco, Nabuco and Oswaldo Aranha. After being restored and consolidated in the period of President Geisel and Minister Azeredo da Silveira, the new paradigm was maintained by the New Republic” (RICUPERO, 2010: p.3).

The concept of *Responsible Pragmatism*, served to underline the differences during the military government of Castelo Branco (1964-1967), where it was defined as involving “ideological frontiers” (Idem), which were laid down on the basis of the so-called theory of “concentric circles”, according to which Brazilian interests were subject to a geographical rationale. In this theory, the first circle entailed giving priority to relations within the hemisphere and its central aim was to check the advance of communism in Latin America, as made clear by Geisel in a speech delivered to the Rio Branco Institute, in 1964. In this pronouncement, the President criticized the PEI, [Independent Foreign Policy] and accused it of being “unduly neutral”. He continued by “also announcing an unconditional alignment with the West led by the United States of America” (SIMÕES, 2009: p.2).

Nonetheless, although differences can be discerned between the governments during the period of military dictatorship and those that succeeded it after the return to democracy, with regard to the SSC, the movement of “approximation” to other countries in the South followed its own course. Thus it is worth pointing out that the first official visit paid by a Brazilian president to Africa occurred during the mandate of General João Figueiredo (1979-1985), who went to Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Cape Verde and Algeria. This movement grew in momentum and diversified in the 1980s, especially in the area of trade, as is made clear in the passage below:

At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s in particular, there was a great increase in the flow of goods and capital between Brazil and Africa. While Brazil was exporting industrial goods, food, cars, armaments and infrastructure services, it was importing an increasing amount of oil from the African continent and thus had a growing interest not only in the African soil but also in its waters. It was at this time that Braspetro, a subsidiary of Petrobras, began its exploration of oil in the continent. Similarly, the Vale Mining Company of Rio Doce (Vale) embarked on projects

in African territories in the area of mining, and the public works contractors Mendes Jr. and Odebrecht which began to play a role in building roads, bridges, ports and hydro-electric plants (MONTEATH DE FRANÇA, 2013: 73).

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Hence at the beginning of the 1990s, under the aegis of neo-liberal thinking, the idea of globalization began to act as a driving-force behind a greater flow of commercial exchanges to African countries and increased the presence of Brazilian private enterprise on the continent. However, owing to internal crises and an unfavorable international climate, during the government of Itamar Franco (1992-1994), few initiatives were supported. Throughout the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002), there was a growing expression of public opinion in Brazil that began to criticize this same phenomenon of globalization, on account of the asymmetrical relationships that were established through its rationale. As a result, there was a slight shift in the relationship with the African continent in an attempt to alleviate the increasing amount of social pressure “There were already signs of the stance it adopted in its attempt to form a better public image for foreign observers. This grew in momentum and was openly declared by the government that followed” (Idem: 74).

This shift in attitude, which mainly reflected a concern to restore some of the country's credibility with international creditors and investors after a period of insolvency and stagnation, can be illustrated by the decision to actively involve the Armed Forces in any UN peace missions in the continent and on presidential visits. In the same way, it is reflected in the officially-sponsored trips to the counterpart of the Brazilian President, the South-African, Nelson Mandela, whose visit to Brazil took place in 1998.

Apart from recovering the lost prestige of former times, these efforts resulted in a strengthening of ties with African countries through signed agreements of cooperation in different areas (Idem: 75). However, although this movement of drawing Brazil closer to other countries in the South, gathered momentum at this time – in particular, for the purposes of this article, with regard to Africa – it can be argued that it really took off during the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002-2010).

This alteration in the way foreign policy was conducted can be understood as a change of paradigm, in so far as this acceleration resulted from a decision to give priority to strengthening political, economic and social ties with developing countries. Thus, the line of argument put forward here, is to draw attention to the correspondence between this decision and the factors that gave rise to the electoral success of the Workers' Party (PT) which in 2002, offered an alternative platform in favor of a change in the political and economic scenario of Brazil.

In fact the election of Lula to the Presidency was a sign of the same discontent that reverberated throughout Latin America since the political elites were associated with the discourse of austerity and the implementation of measures of fiscal and monetary adjustment, that were in tune with the neo-liberal hymn sheet. In light of this, what until then had been seen as a bitter remedy that was necessary to tackle economic stagnation and indebtedness and allow a renewal of growth and international credibility, began to be viewed as an evil that had to be combated. This shift in attitude was due to the meager results obtained from the drastic cuts in the public budget, the reduction of consumption, the privatization of State-run companies and the rise in the unemployment rate. Although these measures affected almost all the economic sectors, they had a more serious effect on the underprivileged classes who were more dependent on the dynamics

of redistribution carried out by their States and more susceptible to the dire effects of economic fluctuations on account of their lower capacity to make savings.

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The dissatisfaction of the working classes with the ruling elite that spread throughout South America, allowed a group of leaders to emerge who were pledged to make changes in their name; that is, they were committed to acting on behalf of the excluded. The perception is that having been liberated from their past, these people wanted to see their pressing concerns duly represented in the process of forming the *national interest* and hence choose leaders who could (in ethnic, social, or political terms) be identified with the working-class. There thus arose a new identity pattern linked to a perspective of subalternity/exclusion as a feature that defines the identities of the working classes and which must be espoused by leaders who put themselves forward as their representatives. However, since it is a powerful concept, this perspective is able to cut across State boundaries and allow new symbolic constructs to emerge that are able to foster ties of belonging so that other sections of the public can also be identified with the subalterns. It was thus on the basis of this commitment to solidarity with the excluded that the main guidelines of domestic politics were defined by the Brazilian government and its foreign policy carried out.

On the other hand, the rejection of neo-liberalism can give rise to the notion of a *neo-developmental* as a model of government that can be defined as a plan for the restoration of State capacities so that they are disencumbered by the measures of adjustment implemented under the aegis of economic orthodoxy in the past. At any rate, the prefix *neo*, (used to characterize this new model) is clearly differentiated from the *national-developmental* of the 20th Century because in this new approach the State does not act as a leader that governs the processes of modernization. It does not act as either the guarantor (in obtaining international loans) or as the productive class but is confined to the activities of regulation, investment in infra-structure and redistributive capacities.

In view of this, by continuing to finance some productive activities through funding by public banks and acting as a regulatory body, the aim of the government is to stimulate private initiatives to enter the country's strategic areas of development by offering loans, subsidies and concessionary agreements. However, its main function is distributive and, for this purpose, it employs strategies of social inclusion by means of income distribution programs which, in contrast, serve as a stimulus of growth by broadening consumption. Nonetheless another important attribute that characterizes *neodevelopmentalism* is the emphasis on democracy and the idea of participation which (albeit on a discursive plane) engages in a non-subaltern empowerment of the working-class, either through their corporate bodies (Argentina and Brazil) or through direct participation (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador).

This decision entails crossing domestic borders and strengthening the movement of cooperation and solidarity with the excluded from other countries, in particular those who like us have suffered the consequences of being left on the margins of the international system. Even so, it must be underlined that social inclusion cannot simply be bestowed as a moral value that is deprived of utilitarian benefits. This is because it has proved to be an effective way of leveraging economic growth and is operated on the basis of a rise in consumption through income distribution programs and in particular by a rise in workers' salaries. Moreover, in the international sphere, priority given to developing countries cannot be regarded as a mere ideological decision that is bereft of pragmatic goals.

For this reason, the dichotomy between ideology and pragmatism renders a disservice to analytical studies of foreign affairs in so far as they obstruct the perception of the strategic value of cooperation and solidarity. In view of this, as an illustration of the argument outlined here, it is worth noting the extract below which has been taken from a speech delivered to students at the Rio Branco Institute in April 2007, by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations at that time:

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Foreign politics is traditionally seen as the defense of the national interest. And anything that is not regarded as the defense of the national interest will be treated as dishonest or naive. (...) But there is something that is worth thinking about: I think that there can be dialectic between the national interest and solidarity. No county, no president and no foreign minister can cease to defend the national interest. This is his essential mission. But is there necessarily a contradiction between the national interest and a kind of search for solidarity? I don't think so (...) Solidarity corresponds to our national interest in the long term. It cannot correspond to our interest in the short term. It cannot correspond to the sectorial interest of a particular part of industry or agriculture or Brazilian business. But it corresponds to our long-term interest. (AMORIM, apud LOPES, 2011: 77-78).

The central hypothesis of the research carried out in this article (with regard to the initiatives of cooperation with developing countries, in particular the African countries with Portuguese as their official language) involves a recognition of the following. Although their origin can be traced back to earlier times, it is owing to the electoral success of the Workers' Party that they have attained new heights, to an extent that they can be regarded as the key to a new breakthrough. The reason for understanding the changes in Brazilian foreign policy as a shifting paradigm, thus shapes an approach, which enables us to understand the movement of "approximation" to the developing countries, which are not hostage to the dichotomy of pragmatism versus ideology.

The dynamics of this movement again forges the alliances established by the countries of the Southern Hemisphere with the aim of competing for a greater awareness of their vicissitudes in the midst of an international order that is determined to polarize the East and West and transcend this binarism. In reality, it responds to an evaluative choice that is driven by an ideal of justice and social inclusion, which is gathering momentum in Latin America and has been stimulated by the deleterious effects of the neo-liberal measures of adjustment in the social fabric. Nonetheless, this feeling is devoid of pragmatic interests since it is shaped in an awareness of the fact that a reduction in State planning on behalf of the market, has not resulted in an upsurge in economic growth but rather led to an increase in inequality that has not been accompanied by any significant economic benefits.

Apart from attaining an ideal of social justice, distributive measures geared towards the less privileged social classes, have proved to be more effective in fostering growth than universalist strategies or those serving the interests of the elite. This conviction cuts across the frontiers of domestic politics and allows them to become the guidelines for the performance of the Brazilian government on the international stage. In this sphere, the strategic character of making choices for the developing world is reinforced by the emergence of China, as well as the crisis of 2008, and the subsequent displacement of capital flows of investment from the center to the periphery.

Following the same rationale, the alliances with the developing countries on behalf of a more justly configured world order, enables Brazil to fulfill its ambitions and increase its prestige with investors and creditors, as well as to achieve a prominent position

among international organizations – as, for example, the claim by Brazil for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In the same way, the cooperation initiatives aimed at implementing learning processes in some of these countries, envisage an ideal of justice and solidarity but are also in favor of a greater degree of commercial capital flows. They also provide support for investments by Brazil as the representative of the developing nations, as well as for the multilateral forums.

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These investments aim at a broader and more inclusive approach when faced with the struggle for a world order that is responsive to their underlying principles which, as well as being more just, are more beneficial to their economic interests. It is in this way that one can understand the stance adopted by Brazil in supporting biofuels and the lifting of trade barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) on basic goods together with the UN and WTO. In this way, they give a voice to the characteristic interests of developing countries in which they are included, although they are striving for a greater degree of legitimacy as the representative of interests that cut across borders.

#### **4. Possible Repercussions of Turning to the *Lusofonia* South**

On the question of Brazilian exports, attention should be drawn to the shift of foreign policy initiatives in favor of the peoples in the Southern Hemisphere. In 2000, 38% of the goods exported were sent to developing countries, a rate which had reached 57% by the end of the decade. In contrast, the United States – which for a long period had been the main arena of our diplomacy and trade – ceased to have 25% of the list of products exported from the country (which was the figure in 2000) and became the destination of only 10% of exported goods (MONEATH DE FRANÇA, 2013:84). With regard to Africa, the same trend can be found. Brazil became established in the role of a trading partner but unlike the case of our role in traditional markets, it concentrated on selling agricultural goods and *commodities*, although it is clear that the country is now becoming an exporter of capital, manufactured goods and technology.

Since solidarity and capacity for representation are fostered by ties of identity (LACLAU, 2005) the choice of the recipients met the criteria of ethnic, and cultural proximity and mainly involved Latin America and Africa. For the same reason, within these groups, priority was given to those who had greater ties of identity, which explains the choice of the countries with Portuguese as their official language, as the main destination of cooperative initiatives by the Brazilian government on the African continent.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the PALOPS countries and East Timor are the main recipients of the cooperation granted by Brazil in the area of technical support. In its electronic site, the Ministry makes clear that the areas of priority are professional training, food security, agriculture, health and back-up services for institutions. A part of these activities are carried out through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which negotiates, implements and monitors projects and programs of technical cooperation, and gives priority to national areas of development defined in the sectorial plans and programs of the Government and agreements signed by the country with other countries and international bodies.

It is stated in a Report by the *Brazilian Cooperation for International Development: (2005-2009)*, issued by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) (in partnership with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the President of the Republic (SAE/PR), with MRE and ABC, between 2005 and 2009), that the total sum of money provided by the

Brazilian Government to finance the international cooperation initiatives reached the substantial figure of R\$ 2.898.526.873,49. This fund was divided between the modalities of humanitarian aid, grants for overseas studies, technical, scientific and technological cooperation and contributions to international organizations. As shown in the graph below, of the total invested, 76% was devoted to “international organizations and regional banks while the other modalities (humanitarian aid, grants for study and technical cooperation) were given less than 24% of the total amount” (Idem, p.19).

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[\*Information in Figure 2.2 Main areas of activity in the South-South Cooperation agreements – Industry 16% / Health 14% / Education 11% / Environment 6% / Public Security 6% / Public Administration 4% / Energy 3% / Technical Cooperation 3% / Agriculture 19% / Others 18% Source: ABC, 2009. N.B. The amounts represent the percentage of the total portfolio of the projects]

Furthermore, it is worth noting that in this period, the funds used to pay for these initiatives “practically doubled and increased from R\$ 384.2 million to more than R\$ 724 million respectively” (Idem). This increase is even more significant when the funds devoted to humanitarian aid and technical cooperation are taken into account. During these years they increased sixfold, and went from R\$ 28.9 million, in 2005 (7.53% of the total budget for the year), to R\$ 184.8 million, in 2009 (25.51% of the total budget for the year). In this way, in corroboration of the argument outlined here, the report underlines the fact that this amount “represents an unquestionable sign of the growing importance that Brazil was attributing to international cooperation in the global arena of economic and social development” (Idem).

### Final Considerations

By examining contemporary international developments, it can be confirmed that political, diplomatic, economic and strategic alignments and re-alignments presuppose their power and capacity for relations of cultural significance and the creation of new kinds of action, as was underlined by Victor Santos (2005). Thus, the author claims, the CPLP, as a plural community, (characterized by diversity while at the same time being re-united by the common factor of language) is an institutionalized expression of the lusophone world. It can be claimed to be a concrete political reality in the international sphere and a stabilizing element that can lead to the convergence of peoples and mitigate the segregational effect of political boundaries between States. It can also integrate spaces on the basis of its own rationale by helping to establish a new set of social and cultural benchmarks. These are of a “large deterritorialized space that can be defined as a common cultural and linguistic, transversal and unified frontier of an affective, social and

human expression" (SANTOS, 2005: 82).

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Within this harmonious community, Brazil must broaden its relations of cooperation in the Lusophone Space in distinct ways: multilaterally, in the sphere of CPLP; and bilaterally, with the Portuguese-speaking countries (both from the CPLP and the PALOPS). In addition, it must face a number of basic challenges, which are set out below, so that an attempt can be made to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of a *Luso-Afro-Brazilian Community*:

1. To recognize the value of a common culture: there are many challenges and perhaps the main one is to confer a greater value on culture. Our tradition of foreign policy and diplomacy (the primacy of *hard politics* to the detriment of *soft politics*) fails to appreciate that culture plays a key role when initiatives are undertaken that involve regional integration and unification. This is particularly the case when the factor responsible for bringing together different countries is a cultural asset as, in the case of CPLP, where the link and justification is the Portuguese language. Thus in attempting to strengthen the South-South cooperation and the *Luso-Afro-Brazilian community*, it is necessary to go forward by setting up and consolidating bilateral and multilateral partnerships.
2. To allow it to be involved as much as possible in the CPLP: as Pereira (2011) states, one of the main challenges of the community is to maintain this rhythm in the next few years. This will entail encouraging its members to take an active part in seeking to carry out specific activities that are based on a recognition of the significance that can be attached to the sheer number of people who speak Portuguese and have a common cultural heritage, while at the same time, exploiting the economic potential of the CPLP.
3. To recognize differences: in the so-called *Lusophone Space*, there are radically differing realities in economic, demographic, cultural, political and even linguistic terms.<sup>8</sup> Added to this is the fact that in this deterritorialized space, there is a community that lacks cohesion and is very unequal. Unless this is acknowledged, the *potentialities* of the space cannot be successfully exploited (PEREIRA, 2011).
4. To handle the problem of fragmentation: in contrast with the geographically concentrated linguistic realities, the lusophone culture, like *Pan-Slavism*, is a "diaspora" — a pluricontinental culture, that is scattered round the world and characterized by a huge ethnic and racial diversity. On the one hand, this feature can be viewed as a defect or problem, given the difficulty of organizing such a heterogeneous reality. On the other hand, it can also be regarded as a virtue since the internationalization of lusophone culture is assisted by the fact that it is broken into scattered units. These have not been subordinated to any other people outside the *Lusophone Space*. This is the result of multifarious dynamics with important "return flows" because we are able to rely on organized political support (from the CPLP), which is able to attract speakers of other languages (Idem).
5. To invest in the sociocultural dimension of lusophonia: Santos (2005) points out that civil society is essentially the place where the transnationalization of *Lusophonia* takes place. It is where informal networks for the strengthening of Portuguese-speaking communities are brought together with the communities of lusophone emigrants scattered around the world. This occurs along a frontier of widespread territorial expression, where the human outlines are well defined in their linguistic and cultural components. According to this author, this sociocultural dimension of lusophonia has remained practically unexplored even though it represents a potential strategy that can transcend

the spatial and geopolitical expression of each member-State of the CPLP and overcome national perceptions that are formed on the basis of geo-economic and politico-diplomatic factors. Exploiting this potential has its own significance and perhaps carries more weight for the Luso-Afro-Brazilian Community in the international arena.

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Despite this list of challenges, it should be noted that the strengthening of cooperation between Portuguese-speaking countries has a great ally: the foreign policy of the 21st Century which transforms and updates the past by mingling the North-South and South-South dimensions in a balanced way. The growth of South-South relations, according to Pecequilo (2008) is one of the factors that has made Brazil less vulnerable to the recent problems that have been experienced by the American economy and has meant that it has increased its bargaining power when faced with the vertical axis. The perception of Brazil as a medium-sized power and emerging nation needs to be accompanied by a diplomacy with a high profile that is appropriate to its capacities and needs.

If it is to be successful, the undertaking of forming a community or lusophone space requires the involvement of the people who speak Portuguese, as well as the powers, representatives, and administrators of civil society. There should also be a recognition of the value of the *Negritude* movement which, as Pereira (2001) points out, seeks to combat racism and colonialism and uphold the values of African culture, while deploring the effects that European culture has had on the traditions of the peoples of that continent. Finally, one should be aware of the fact that Lusophonia is not a single, cohesive and unified idea in all the Portuguese-speaking countries and that at times, it can cause unease by its association with the central features of the Portuguese dimension and hence, colonization. It is thus preferable to employ the term *Luso-Afro-Brazilian Community*, which lays stress on both the aspect of linguistic unity and integration ("the community") and the respect for cultural diversity and multiple identities (*Africanness, Brazilianness and "Lusitanianness"*), as is put forward by Pereira (2011). The formation of the *Luso-Afro-Brazilian* concept should not set out by eradicating African languages and cultures.

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### Notes

1 The territories of the former Portuguese India can also be included since Portuguese is spoken there: Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and

Nagar-Haveli.

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2. (MOUFFE, 1993: 141)

3. A fuller discussion on the significance and differences between the terms is carried out by Pereira (2011), see: pages 20 to 24.

4. As the Minister of Foreign Relations explains, the community originally comprised Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São Tomé and Príncipe. After its independence in 2002, East Timor became integrated with the group. This organization which was based on the principle of solidarity which was established in July 1996, on the occasion of the 1st Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Portuguese-speaking countries (Lisbon). The aim was to offer its members a privileged space for strengthening and extending these ties and it was driven by three key objectives (cooperation in all domains, political and diplomatic consultation, and the promotion of the Portuguese language). It set out from the principle that the member-States share historic, ethnic and cultural ties with each other.

5. This definition can be found on the electronic site of the United Nations South-South Cooperation Bureau. Available at <[www.ssc.undp.org](http://www.ssc.undp.org)>.

6. Initiatives of Collaboration involving traditional donor countries (from the North) and multilateral organizations, but established with the purpose of making South-South initiatives possible through financial loans, training and technological systems, as well as other forms of management support which are defined by the concept *triangular cooperation* (Idem).

7. In 1987, the DCT and Subin, were abolished and replaced by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), with the aim of combining the political decision-making and operational activities of the technical cooperation projects in a single body (LIRA GOES, 2010: 35).

8. On the basis of data from the Observatório da Língua Portuguesa [Centre for Portuguese Language], Pereira (2011) shows that the percentage of speakers of Portuguese as their mother tongue varies between the members of CPLP: Brazil (99.7%), Portugal (96%), Angola (40%), Cape Verde (40%), S. Tomé and Príncipe (20%), Mozambique (6,5%), East Timor (6%), Guinea-Bissau (5%).

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