

From the “Washington Consensus” to the “Seoul Consensus”: What role for the State in Governance?

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Abstract

The initial concept of governance, as specified by the World Bank in 1992 and inspired in a normative perspective by the “Washington Consensus”, was the bearer of a perspective of the withdrawal of the State in a process to which different kinds of actors were invited to provide answers to the deficit of legitimacy and effectiveness encountered by several countries. More recently, in 2010, the adoption by the members of the G20 of the “Seoul Consensus” marked a new stage in the conception of governance, thus moving away from the approach of the “Washington Consensus”. The aim of the present paper is to analyse the reasons for the transition from one Consensus to another and to specify more particularly what this evolution involves for the role of the State in Governance. To this end, this analysis investigates the limits of Governance applied according to its initial design and identifies some changes in the international system, including the arrival of emerging powers in a context of multiple crises in order to identify the repercussion on States. All of these elements lead us to reconsider the role of the State in global governance, particularly in the light of the “Seoul Consensus”.

Keywords

Washington Consensus, Seoul Consensus, global governance

Introduction

During the last decade, numerous critical analysis have been raised against global governance (Held 2006 f.eg.), such critics stimulated here by limits in the results of governance, there by contemporary challenges which the actors of the international system, whatever their nature, were less and less able to face with an efficient and/or legitimate answer. Such observations openly raising the question of the crisis of global governance (Park, Conca & Finger, 2008 – Tanaka, 2008...) in its various aspects generated the questioning of the very legitimacy of governance as initially proposed by IGO's such as the World Bank (1992). This World Bank approach tended to implicitly promote a shift from "government" to "governance" Such a shift indirectly promoted the principle of reduction of the State from "governing" toward "governed" in global governance. However, for various reasons (limits of governance, resistance from States ...), this shift did not reach the ultimate stage of governance, therefore generating the appearance of the "governance"¹ phenomenon. The observations of the crisis and the governance phenomenon lead to reconsider the question of governance, reconsideration stimulated by the reactions, especially from State actors, in a new perspective of a complex international system.

When, at the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of Governance was no longer considered as obsolete, as it had been since the 18th century, the perspective in which it was defined did not fail to question the place of the State. In fact, the bodies on the international scene which have revived this concept have defined it in these terms: "... the way in which power is exercised in the management of the economic and social resources of a country for its development" (World Bank, 1992, 1). From the outset, such a definition thus laid emphasis on the management of the State and its role. The publication of the World Bank's Report, stating its approach to Governance, took place at a time when two ideas were propagated on a global scale by two initiatives which will inspire this concept in a normative perspective: the "Washington Consensus"² on the one hand and the "Washington Security Agenda" on the other:

the former according to which the positive role of the government is to be fundamentally distrustful with regard to the central fields of socio-economic life (from the regulation of markets to disaster planning), and the latter which wishes that the sustainable application of the policies and regulations decided at the international level will jeopardise freedom, limit growth and prevent development. (Kazancigil A, 2002, 70)

Two decades later, at the end of their Annual Summit in 2010, the Heads of State and Government who were members of the G 20 published a Declaration in which the "Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth" is presented. Such a speech seems to indicate the adoption of a new approach to the concept of Governance. Over and above the symbolism that the use of the term "consensus" in the Seoul declaration could represent, it is important to investigate the reasons for the transition from the

"Consensus of Washington" to the "Consensus of Seoul" and identify the implications on the place of the State in Governance. This will make it possible to evaluate to what extent the transition from one to the other constitutes in this perspective, and over and above speeches, a continuity or a change for the State actor.

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From Washington to Seoul: Why?

During the last two decades of the 20th century, on account, in particular, of the phenomenon of multiple globalisations, we have witnessed a shift of the concept of "government" towards that of "governance" (Vercauteren, 2004). This latter, as specified by the World Bank under the inspiration of the "Washington Consensus", was presented as being able to find solutions to the problems of legitimacy and efficiency that several State actors were experiencing, in a context of a transformation crisis of the State (McCarthy & Jones, 1995). From this time on, governance was perceived as a possible response to what was defined as a "crisis of governability" (Mayntz, 1993).

In this context, the "Washington Consensus" impacted on the concept of governance by conferring on it a strong prescriptive value through a certain number of principles: transparency, accountability, the fight against corruption, the respect of the rule of law and human rights, decentralisation and balancing the budget through the reduction of public expenditure ... (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). More specifically, the "Washington Consensus" aimed to reinforce economic liberalisation and to adapt the public domain (local, national and global) to the institutions and to the processes dominated by the markets. In such a framework, the State will find itself somehow formatted under the constraint of the markers laid down by international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which will embody this approach to governance on the global level. In other terms, the principal bodies of world governance have constituted the main vectors of external pressures on the State... in favour of the withdrawal of this latter and consequently the arrival of the phenomenon of the shift of "government" towards "governance". Such an approach will be recommended not only in the developing countries but also in the Northern hemisphere, the countries of this latter having been encouraged in this direction not only by international bodies but also by leaders of the main industrialised countries benefiting from a preponderance in the formal bodies of global governance. In this regard, Ali Kazancigil observes that :

Governance (for the countries of the North) seemed to be able to give satisfying results in situations where the hierarchical dimension is weak and the heterarchical dimension strong with multiple partners with different statuses : public and private, or belonging to different jurisdictions and countries. (Kazancigil, op. cit, 8).

By its logic, governance has therefore been the bearer and has stimulated a movement of deregulation and even regulation. The formal processes have thus suffered a movement of withdrawal in favour of informal arrangements. It is this that Yannis Papadopoulos notes when he underlines: "Governance often brings a de-formalisation of decision-making structures ..." (Papadopoulos, 2002, 135).

This approach to governance, the principles and practices that it bears and which will be considered as transposable to all the countries of the world, will be the subject of a calling into question, mainly for two reasons: on the one hand the acknowledgement of the weaknesses of governance recommended by the "Washington Consensus", and on the other hand, the modifications affecting the international system.

The Crisis of Governance

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The recourse to governance at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th Century was elaborated and implemented in a period which saw the convergence of several factors: bringing to light the weaknesses in the management of the countries of the Southern hemisphere, weaknesses that were prejudicial to their development, the criticisms of the bureaucratic apparatus and hypertrophied missions in several States of the Northern Hemisphere, a criticism symbolised particularly by the expression of Ronald Reagan: "The State is not the solution. The State is the problem".

However, in spite of the dominant conception of governance, this showed its limitations and weaknesses, giving rise to criticisms as far as it was concerned and this well before the current economic depression. These criticisms were thus expressed particularly on the occasion of the successive crises which, from 1994 onwards, struck countries as diverse as Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, Russia, Argentina and Turkey, crises whose responsibility was attributed, at least in part, to the recipes of the Washington Consensus.

A first weakness lies at the very heart of the governance process. Although intended to favour the interactions between the State and society by offering the means of a horizontal coordination, rather than a vertical one, between the partners interested by a challenge (the "stakeholders"), governance by the withdrawal of the State that this involves and making it just an actor amongst others in this logic of horizontality, has weakened the capacity of the State actor to control, or even to simply ensure this coordination. Thus, the efficiency that is meant to be favoured by the process of governance is reduced. Governance thus becomes more a question and a process of auto-regulation between actors submitted to increasingly inexistent or inefficient controls, for example, by using controlling bodies that are not or no longer public bodies but private ones such as certification agencies. Such a situation leaves the door open to the relationships between the most influential who carry the decision, thus making governance more chaotic (Smouts, 1998).

But other criticisms and weakness will be highlighted. From 2006 onwards, several analyses would underline the lack of means implemented by the international bodies, bearers of the principles and the missions of governance, as well as the means aimed at solving major contemporary problems such as those of the environment, poverty and security, which is synonymous with underlining the insufficiencies of this governance. Amongst the criticisms raised against global governance, David Held observed that these limitations are compounded by certain deep roots of contemporary challenges:

- the great asymmetry of life expectancy within the same State and from one State to another;
- the deterioration of the economic prosperity of sectors such as agriculture or textiles in certain countries, while others prosper and subsidise these same sectors;
- the creation of global financial flows able to very rapidly destabilise national economies; Susan Strange was speaking in this case of « mad money » or « casino money » (Strange, 1998);
- the development of serious transnational problems concerning common property; (Held, 2006).

The fundamental weakness observed at the very heart of the governance process, as far

as coordination is concerned, can be found under different facets in the workings of the international bodies, facets which, schematically, given their well-known characteristics, can be presented as follows:

- an absence of a clear division of work between the many intergovernmental organisations intervening in one way or another in global governance: their functions and spheres of competence often overlap; their mandates frequently enter into conflict; and their objectivity is often questionable.
- inertia in the operating methods of the intergovernmental organisations concerned and their incapacity to implement common solutions;
- the multiplication of issues and challenges which go beyond the traditional cleavage of "internal affairs" and "foreign affairs" which all too often leads to a lack of accountability at global level (no one knows who should engage his or her responsibility ... when the States allow this to be done).
- The lack of responsibility of the agencies themselves resulting from the imbalance of forces between the States and between State and non-State actors in the implementation of global policies.

It is symptomatic to note the extent to which the accumulation of evidence of the limitations of governance led to the conclusion, as early as 2004, of the failure of the Washington Consensus (Maxwell, 2005)³.

Consequently, the accumulation of the weaknesses of governance at a global level, more particularly in its lack of a legitimate coordination body, ends up by turning not only against governance but also against the States. It is true that the responsibility of this deficiency at international level is that of the State actors themselves who refuse to formally abandon their sovereignty to a supranational body to which they have nevertheless entrusted missions concerning governance. Ultimately, the State finds itself as much an accomplice as a victim, as it is confronted with a tension between the logic of a withdrawal that is desired and even encouraged by the public actor at national or local level and a total or partial refusal to continue in the same logic with regard to the international bodies. This makes it possible to note how much the advent of global governance has been loaded with ambiguity on the place and the role of the State in this. The crisis of governance (Park et al. 2008) thus appears as the result of the convergence of weaknesses, of its internal logic, of the limitations of the global bodies that embody this, the accumulation of limited results or even the failures at national level.

An International System Modified in an Environment of Crises

The crisis of global governance came about in an environment within which the international system underwent a certain number of evolutions, the scope of which will affect the debates on governance itself. A first aspect to be noted, as far as this is concerned, lies in the modification of the international structure of the system. In this regard, the debate on the configuration of the new structure, in the making since the end of the Cold War, reveals the difficulty of finding a new definition. Since 1989, the interpretations have sometimes succeeded and sometimes been in confrontation with each other. The classical reading of the bipolar world has given place to the postulate of uni-polarity under the auspices of the USA (Krauthammer, 1991), a hypothesis that is contested by the multipolar approach (particularly Peral 2009). This interpretation

is criticised in its turn by authors such as Fidler and Nicoli, who underline the too large disparity between the powers, from the military, economic and scientific viewpoints (Fidler & Nicoli, 2011), without, for this, going as far as the idea of the end of polarity in the world (Haass, 2008). For his part, Grevi attempts to move beyond the simple observation of the plurality of poles by advancing the analysis of the inter-polarity of the international system, the inter-polar character being defined as multipolarity at the age of interdependence, an approach that we will see further on and that will prove to have a certain relevance in the present statements. Grevi specifies his thought in noting three characteristics of inter-polarity: a) it is based on interest (as it is built on the convergence of the interests of the main international actors); b) it is stimulated by challenges (as it is focalised on the challenges requiring cooperative solutions); c) it is directed towards the processes (Grevi, 2009: 5). The abundance and the succession of hypotheses make it possible to note the extent to which, in its structure, the international system is going through a succession of changing phases showing more a characteristic of instability and transition, which Munson speaks of in underlining the « unbalanced multipolarity » (Munson 2011). For over and above the difficulty of qualifying the structure of the system, several characteristics should be noted, making it possible to advance in the analysis of the question of contemporary government and consequently, of the place of the State in this. Over and above the aspects already mentioned by Grevi, we would like to underline the extent to which the growing interdependence has the result of seeing events taking place on one side of the planet generating systemic effects (Munson, 2011).

In addition to the structure of the international system, the evolutions of these last few years can also be observed in fields as diverse as security and economics, some changes which merit to be underlined. In the field of security, the nature of the main challenges has changed. Thus, as Easterbrook underlines, the risk, on a planetary scale, of dying in a war is at its lowest level in the history of mankind (Easterbrook, 2009). Admittedly, we can observe the growing spread of military capacity in the world, including conventional and non-conventional arms, amongst a growing number of actors on the international scene, State and non-State actors. The contemporary world is also characterised by this expression of Gill Bates: "*fewer wars, but more violence*" (Bates, 2010: 330). However, contrary to what could be observed up until the end of the Cold War, the rationality of the global expenditure on armaments, principally promoted by the most powerful States, is more part of a desire for individual protection rather than a rivalry with regard to other powers, the majority of the States being more interested in the conquest of markets than in the appropriation of territories. Without excluding, nevertheless, the determination to protect themselves against the threats to their security, States intend to ensure that these latter do not change their economic interests. It is in this sense that "the economisation of security" is now underlined (Rühle, 2013)⁴.

In the economic field, globalisation, over these past few years, has revealed certain limitations. On the one hand, as Kinkel and Maloca observe, under the effects of the economic crisis, the movement to delocalise firms is undergoing a certain decline (Kinkel and Maloca, 2010). On the other hand, in spite of the appearance of new global challenges, such as the environment, water or energy, several political decision-makers have opted for a renationalisation in certain fields. This trend can in fact be observed as far as energy is concerned (in Russia or in Venezuela for example), but also in different parts of the world, as far as water resources are concerned. These issues seem *a priori* to encourage the States which re-control them to return to a behaviour of "going it alone". This therefore

tends to corroborate the hypothesis of the "realist" perspective of a return to power relationships, which goes against the force invested in international norms. Admittedly, such a statement can only be made for a limited number of States, some former powers, and other emerging States, characterised by the recent acquisition, the re-acquisition or the recent determination to acquire the means of power. However, a fall-back on isolated national strategies rather than collective ones can also be observed amongst those States that are users of raw materials. Finally, the increasing rise of or the maintaining of inequalities and the low social mobility of the nations, in spite of their opening-up to world trade, and the imposition of a model of economics operating on the basis of a Western model tend to stimulate a negative perception of – and to prevent – the appropriation of globalisation by all. In a large number of developing countries, the broken promises, on the one hand, concerning the establishment of a modern State resulting from decolonisation and, on the other, of the hoped-for economic and social development, have generated in-depth economic, social, demographic and political imbalances, thus giving rise, in a context of global financial and economic crisis, to security challenges expressed by reactions which were shown in different ways such as the increase of popular uprisings, organised crime, illegal immigration, and the trafficking of human persons.

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Lastly, among the impacts of the financial and economic crisis, two aspects deserve to be underlined. The first lies in the fact that in reaction to the financial crisis and its economic and social consequences. Appeals have multiplied for a more marked re-intervention of the State in the economy, whereas governance, in its initial concept, inspired by the Washington Consensus, intended to reduce its role. The second aspect can be seen in political thought and programmes, particularly on the conception of the State and its role. Even if for several years, analyses like those of Chantal Delsol have made it possible to take up the crisis of meaning in the contemporary world (Delsol, 2004), the multiple current tensions add to the confusion of political decision-makers. In this regard, several elections organised between 2008 and 2011 in different European countries, for example, have generally not allowed left-wing parties to advance new mobilising utopias and achieve electoral successes, even though the economic crisis was a context which was *a priori* more favourable to them. For their part, leaders or parties more to the right of the political spectrum were forced to accept, or even to promote, State intervention to save the economy and employment, whereas their speeches and their previous acts pleaded in favour of the withdrawal of the public actor. It was not just George W. Bush who found himself forced in 2008 to have a "Paulson Plan" adopted by the American Congress, which was previously judged "unnatural" in the United States. In other terms, the financial crisis "moves the lines" of political ideas and programmes.

The evolutions that can be observed both in the field of security and in the international economic sphere, particularly with regard to the creation of wealth, lead us to underline a dual change in the field of power, one affecting its redefinition (Wilson, 2008), the other its re-distribution. The observation made beforehand on the modification of the rationality of States as far as security is concerned, attests to the evolution of the nature of power in the contemporary world. Without wishing to decide definitely on the debate that has been carried out for many years between partisans of "hard power" (for ex. Mersheimer) and those of "soft power" (Nye, in particular), the option given priority in the present contribution leans more towards the observation of a balance in favour of the second option, even if the first cannot be totally disqualified. This evolution can be just as much the result of the acknowledgement of the impossibility for any State, even the

most powerful, to achieve, from now on, its own ends, principally by the use of its classical power based on constraint and force, and to pursue, in an international context marked by a growing interdependence, its national interests by other means, based, in particular on its economic and financial power. Power can thus be more the product of a capacity which is no longer exclusively based on constraint but rather the result of an alchemy⁵ of resources, also including the economic and cultural fields in an internationally formal and informal normative framework of regime, according to the acceptance given by Krasner⁶, a framework which increasingly influences the behaviour of States. The nature of power is affected by a plurality of factors amongst which, without being exhaustive, it is important to underline the arrival of actors of different kinds (public and private) and who are influential on the international scene, the alteration of the concept of security that has become more diversified in its challenges, and lastly the multiplication of transnational and/or global issues, their interconnections and their more complex nature which the multiple crises (environmental, economic-financial, and security-based ...) of the last few years have only accentuated. As a result, the dissemination of power is even stronger, (Bates, 2010) both in its "hard" form and its "soft" form, in the international system in a structure that has become multi-level. The world today is thus struck by a dual complexity, that of its intermingled issues and that of the structure of the system in terms of power. This enables Bertrand Badie to observe: "Precisely, the great surprise that the international order is reserving for us, as we see it evolving, comes from its growing aptitude to oppose obstacles which block the conversion of the resources into capacities." (Badie, 2008: 190). The redefinition of power forms the framework in which its redistribution in the international system will change, while at the same time attesting to a new hierarchy. In the perspective that has been followed until now, the system resulting from the Cold War enables a reading according to the former typology of the three worlds. It was usual, during the Cold War, to classify the States into three categories: the First World comprising essentially the Western democracies, the Second World composed of the States under a Communist regime, and the Third World comprising the Developing Countries. Since the end of the 20th Century, there remains essentially on the one hand, the First World and on the other, the Third World whose States are encouraged to converge towards the development model of the First World which represents, de facto, the reference. This category, according to Yannick Prost, has been marked by the erosion of the cohesion between its members, an erosion which is accompanied, on the one hand, by growing competition and, on the other hand, the appearance of States having acquired a new level of development (Prost, 2007). In this perspective, he underlines "the end of the great Third World alliance" whilst Philippe Moreau-Defarges notes "the erasure of the idea of Third World" (Moreau-Defarges, 2008). It is true that States enjoying a recent economic prosperity had the possibility to progressively leave the group known as "Developing Countries" to constitute, de facto, in between the First and the Third World, a new category which was created in two phases, the first during the 1980s of the "newly industrialised countries" followed, since this last decade, by the "Emerging Countries". These States are therefore animated by the pursuit of interests that are different from those of the Third World, weakening by the same occasion the weight of this latter in international relationships.

This evolution thus leads to the appearance of several categories which can be listed schematically in the following way:

- The Advanced Countries (in which large, medium-sized, and small powers can be found).

- The Emerging Countries.
- The Developing Countries.
- The "failed" or "collapsing countries".

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It should be noted that this enumeration differs from the traditional categorisation of the three worlds mentioned before and this on a major aspect. In fact, the typology in force until the end of the Cold War was the expression of a dual perspective, economic-social on the one hand, and ideological (embodied particularly in the existence of the Second World with an alternative project to the First) on the other hand. With the disappearance of the Second World all that remains of its ideological dimension is a single economic-social vision which can be found not only in the classification of the four categories mentioned, but also in the initial concept of governance.

The arrival of the category of the Emerging Countries forms one of the most striking elements in the reconfiguration of the contemporary powers. In 2000, the economies of the Emerging Countries and the Developing Countries represented 37% of the global economy and the advanced economies 67%. At the end of 2010, the group of Emerging Countries represented 47%, and the Advanced Countries 53%. Even if this evolution were to continue at the present rate, it is foreseeable that there will be parity between these two categories in the coming years. Furthermore, the part of the world output of the 7 most industrialised countries has decreased from 49 to 40% over this last decade (Stone, 2010). In demographic terms, the population of the Advanced Countries should, according to the projections, decrease from 15% of the present population to 10% in 2050 (Jackson & Howe, 2008). It is, however, important to qualify this enumeration and underline the relative character of this insofar as, for example, a State such as China is admittedly often presented in the category of the Emerging Countries, even though its economic weight leads us more to place it amongst the major powers. The growth registered in several Emerging Countries such as China, India and Brazil in the military, economic, scientific and technological indicators (Hart and Jones, 2010) confers, from now, on a more decisive weight in international relations. Admittedly, as stated by Hart and Jones, a large differential persists in these different criteria between the Emerging Countries and the former powers (Hart and Jones, 2010: 70). However, the Emerging Countries have nevertheless obtained, in particular, the enlargement of the G8 to the G20 and the adaptation in their favour of the balance of votes in the official bodies of global governance, such as the IMF and the World Bank. In this regard, the recent economic-financial crisis has accelerated the growth process of the politico-economic weight of the Emerging Countries, to the detriment of the former powers. This redistribution of power in an asymmetric way (Grévi, 2009) is indicative of the transformation and consolidation phase under way in these countries, based on their economic solidification, before being able to translate this into expected results on the international scene, in spite of the prudence which much be observed as regards the possible automaticity between the resources of the powers and the results obtained (Baldwin, 1979).

The Impact on – and of – States

The crises which took place in such different fields as the economy and finance, security, the environment ..., the increasing complexity of the issues and their interconnections, the multiplication of spheres of authority and the redistribution of power in the international system go hand in hand to reinforce the limitations of governance. This appears, in its

incarnation at the global level, as even more un-adapted to the challenges and actors of today. This is what Fiddler and Nicoli underline when they observe: "The main institutions of international governance, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations, bodies created in the aftermath of the Second World War, no longer appear to reflect the contours of the World Economy" (Fidler and Nicoli, 2011: 91) ⁷. In several cases, institutions of global governance, such as the UNO Security Council, no longer represent the new power ratio within the international system.

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All these characteristics mentioned in the contemporary system, particularly in the redistribution of power, form a context of that will advantage the Emerging Countries. These will develop a dual approach that is informal and formal destined to modify the configuration of global governance in their favour. From an informal viewpoint, this approach is marked by the fact that the G20 has gained the upper hand over the G8. From a formal viewpoint, taking advantage of their growing influence in informal forums, the Emerging Countries have obtained, essentially to the detriment of European powers, the reweighting of votes in the decision-making bodies of the official organisations of global governance such as the IMF and the World Bank. This reinforcement of the weight of the Emerging Countries in the formal bodies is, however, not without limitations. Thus, the supreme body of global governance that UNO represents is still not affected by these evolutions, particularly in the composition of the Security Council in spite of the ambitions of States such as India or Brazil to accede to the status of permanent members of this body.

This impact of the modification of the balance of power on the corporate bodies of global governance is accompanied by another evolution, namely the growth of informal bodies such as the G20 to the detriment of formal bodies. The growing influence of informal bodies can be seen, on the one hand, by the multiplication of meetings of groups limited to States, such as the G8 or the G20⁸ meetings to which the heads of IGOs are invited, as these meetings result in resolutions or decisions that the international organisations are invited to implement on a formal basis⁹. Such a tendency shows a *de facto* takeover of these bodies, behind a discourse which, in appearance, reinforces the formal body. This latter then loses its capacity for impetus and finds itself symbolically reduced to a role of executor. Admittedly, a more assertive activism of intergovernmental organisations can be observed, particularly in the increase of the number of Multilateral Conferences, but even in the case of such Conferences organised on UNO initiative, the informal meetings of a few more powerful States constitute the expression of their determination to be preponderant in the governance process¹⁰. Bertrand Badie refers to this evolution under the expression of "*oligarchic diplomacy*" (Badie, 2009: 19). However, it is nevertheless important to note that the tendency to have increasing recourse to the informal dimension of global governance can also be encouraged by non-State actors who intend by their forums to influence public actors (Bouteligier, 2009). However, the shift of the formal towards the informal, while at the same time preserving the interests of the powerful, could have the effect of reducing the legitimacy of the IGOs with the other members, and to consequently generate the reduction of the commitment of these other States to these IGOs and, in extreme cases, bring about their paralysis.

All that has gone before makes it possible to note the attitudes or the strategies developed by the States with regard to global governance based on the evolution of their weight in the international system and their strategies according to which it is possible to divide the States into two categories, namely those States favourable to the preservation

of the system as it exists (the "Status quo States", Munson 2011) and those who wish to see a change. The Status quo strategy of certain big and medium powers before the present period of crises is easy to identify. This can be seen particularly in the inertia of the United States, France and Great Britain with regard to the reform of the United Nations Security Council. It aims to avoid or slow down the decline of their capacity within the balance of power, redefined in the sense specified earlier on in the present contribution. On the other hand, the strategy of the Emerging Countries, favourable to the modifications of the system, needs to be explained more fully. This, in fact, is part of a manoeuvre with multiple options (or several irons in the fire): on the one hand, to exploit the informal and the formal and, on the other hand, the multilateral and the bilateral.

- the informal / formal cleavage: informal by the participation of the G 20 revitalised group and by the development of relations between the BRICS¹¹; and formal in obtaining a more important place in the decision-making bodies of certain organisations of global governance such as the IMF or the World Bank¹², by accentuating the political content of these organisations and by obtaining, notably from the IMF, a gradual moderation of its policy of the liberalisation of markets and in enlarging and reinforcing organisations recently created such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation¹³.

- the multilateral / bilateral, the bypassed multilateralism: thus China, like what is often practised by the United States, does not intend to see its margin of manoeuvre limited to the multilateral area. It does not hesitate, outside the multilateral field, to develop, in parallel, a wide range of bilateral agreements, in which it finds itself in a position more favourable than its partners do. Davenport observes, in this regard, that China is followed in this strategy by the other Emerging Countries, whereas a certain number of these were, for a long time, more favourable to multilateralism (Davenport, 2010). Furthermore, the emerging countries such as China, do not hesitate to have recourse to by-passing multilateral bodies such as the UNO by other forums such as the G20, if this can aid their projects.

This multi-optional choice can also be completed by the North/South dimension, as certain Emerging Countries, such as China, are present in multilateral Summits like that of Copenhagen 2009, on the one hand, playing the strings of solidarity with the Third World, and on the other hand, sitting at the table of the major powers in the United States/China/India trilogue.

What Results?

In a general way, the re-definition of power and its dissemination and re-distribution in the international system, the new structure of dissemination between the different levels, global, regional and national, contribute to the inertia of the international system by not allowing it to respond as effectively as necessary to contemporary challenges, let alone deal with more complex and interwoven issues. It should be noted, however, that the evaluation featured below focuses more on the processes than on the final results (for example, in terms of the development of low-income countries) and the decisions arising from governance, more particularly in the perspective of the State actor therein.

One of the consequences of the economic and financial crisis is to have stimulated calls for a return of the State to governance as it had been too excluded, in a context, moreover, of the redistribution of power. This makes it possible to highlight a paradox. Governance, in fact, through the movement of deregulation and the withdrawal of the State that this implies, has contributed so much to circumventing the political body, that it has found itself weakened and has not been able to prevent the crisis of governance

which has paradoxically had the result... of boosting in retrospect, a desire to bring this political body back on the Agenda. In spite of these exhortations, of the growing number of participants in informal bodies and of the heavier weight of Emerging Countries in international organisations, the action of the States did not result in a resurgence of global governance efficiency. The multiplication of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral meetings has provided results limited to declarative commitments most often without significant constraining value. Notwithstanding the growing pressure of global common issues exceeding the capacity of isolated intervention from the State, even the most powerful one, the declared intentions on the necessity of common global actions have rarely been translated into concrete acts. Disagreements remain in the field of environment. The attempts to reform the regulation of the international financial system are still not effective. Security issues are often the object of disagreement and inertia. The financial crisis has contributed to the takeover by the G20 of the G8, the latter considered as too unrepresentative, the former donning the virtual coat of comprehensive advice aspiring to the leadership of coordination efforts. This evolution admittedly brings a renewal of representative legitimacy to this group of the powerful. In 2008, the G20 represented 85% of the world trade, two-thirds of the population of the planet and over 90% of the gross world product¹⁴. Amongst the members of the G20, China represents on its own 13% of the world output whereas the Developing Countries of the G20 represent over 30% of the world economy (Stone, 2010: 345). But the power of the G20 is not without weakness. On the economic front, the cumulative debt of the members of this group exceeds 100 % of their GDP and follows an upward trajectory (Munson, 2011: 80). Furthermore, the efficiency of the G 20 is still to be demonstrated. "A bigger family is not necessarily a happier one." underline Fidler and Nicoli¹⁵. Coordination between members of the G20 is limited and disagreements remain numerous. The management of the "virtual multipolarity" with 20 these States are representing is often impractical and makes governance heavier rather than lighter. This conclusion is sometimes drawn by some members of the G-20, who, leaving it aside, then resort to *ad hoc* "coalitions of the willing" to stimulate initiatives that could be replicated in formal governance bodies. The G20 States, rather than being primarily driven by a desire for a common approach, have more recourse to the traditional behaviour of pursuing the national interest. This mind-set is observed not only among traditional powers but also in emerging countries. The BRICS do not escape this temptation as their Summits are labelled as being as divisive as the G20 or the UN.

In a global context, admittedly characterized by multiple joint crises, which create a climate of anxiety, the specificities of situations within States generate the most diverse reactions, stimulate withdrawal and particularistic reflexes, which appear to outweigh joint approaches, thus weakening global governance. This latter may also be faced with obstacles that the States oppose, as in the case of inter – or intra-state conflict against which some State actors refuse the intervention of troops under a UN mandate, fearing that this Organization will intervene in an internal crisis.

In general, despite the limits observed for several years, the whole process of governance has remained weakened by insufficient coordination between its informal dimension and the formal bodies. This handicap adds to the persistent disagreements about the solutions to be found not only for common challenges in different issues, such as nuclear proliferation, but also on the institutional means to be granted, for example on the question of strengthening the capacities and skills of institutions such as the IAEA.

Furthermore, *ad hocism* under the constraint of events and crises persists, rather than the adoption of an integrated approach to the various problems, which are, however, interconnected. The growing inter-relation of the issues makes governance even weightier, but at the same time, these issues remain addressed in a compartmentalized manner by States and the formal bodies. In many areas such as trade and the environment, the duration of unfruitful negotiations over several years attests to the extent to which a short-term approach is often preferred to a long-term one¹⁶.

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All the preceding observations thus lead us to notice a progressive distancing of the framework of governance as proposed by the "Washington Consensus" towards a new framework, that of the "Seoul Consensus" that will be the bearer of both a transformed approach to governance and to the role of the State in this approach. However, two characteristics of governance such as it was originally designed can still be observed. A) First of all, it has been specified before how strongly governance had been promoted by the most powerful States, directly and / or through intergovernmental organisations that constituted its main vectors. This finding is confirmed in the current configuration, particularly by the determination of the emerging powers to formally obtain a greater influence in the decision-making bodies of the official bodies of global governance. This political will of the Emerging Countries is corroborated by the same determination of the most powerful to keep this governance under control as far as possible. B) Furthermore, the rise of the Emerging Countries, based on their economic and financial development, attests to the growing importance of economic influence in the substance of contemporary power; this evolution contributes to the fact that, like the previous period, contemporary governance essentially maintains a managerial logic. However, the limitations observed of governance, particularly its inertia, are indicative of contemporary power – no matter whatever State it may be – which remains more reactive than the translation of a capacity to produce changes in the sense desired by those in power.

However, a fundamental difference can be seen in recent years. It was pointed out at the beginning of the first part how governance in its initial concept involved the withdrawal of the State in the name of rediscovering legitimacy based on a greater efficiency in the management of resources and issues. However, several elements combine to attest to the desire for a strong re-engagement of the State in governance:

- The financial and economic crisis, the accentuation and the accumulation of issues beyond the capacity of isolated intervention of the State and the critics against governance as it was managed until then stimulated calls, especially in the developed countries, for a reintegration of the State actor in the governance process, the State trying to seize this opportunity to regain an eroded legitimacy ;
- These calls have converged with the will of emerging countries to increase their weight in bodies and decision-making process of global governance organizations;
- The resolution of a stronger integration of the State is also corroborated by the multiplication of intergovernmental meetings, some of these, like the G 20, taking ascendancy over the IGOs of global governance.

However, this convergence, in particular between advanced countries and emerging countries, on a firmer return of the State in governance cannot hide the divergences on the role of the State over the different challenges and solutions. In this respect, deep differences of conception remain between on the one hand, actors like the United

States where distrust is strong against the public bureaucracy, notably in intervention in economy and, on the other hand, emerging countries such as China where the State still enjoys its full legitimacy. If the first group of States has doubt on its model facing the impact of the financial crisis and global challenges, the second group of States is strengthened in its belief that, as Khandwalla underlined in his research in History, the intervention of the State actor may prove to be decisive in the economic development or redevelopment of a country (Khandwalla, 1999). Such differences of conception have an impact in the relationship of each State actor to governance. If governance, in its initial design intended to privilege, in a logic of setting aside of the State, a horizontal coordination rather than vertical between actors, differences of approach in this regard can be observed:

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– Between some States whose internal legitimacy remains strong and which intend to keep a verticality in relations of power, that is translated by a determination, for example, to reduce the deregulation of markets and strengthen the operational framework of international governance organisations (Stone, 2010);

– and other States whose legitimacy is eroded and which are more inclined to preserve horizontality in the relationships of power between actors of different kinds (public and private) and more anxious to contain the wish for regulation desired by the other category of States.

What is the Answer of “The Seoul Consensus”

Despite such divergences, the distancing from the logic of the Washington Consensus reveals an adaptation and maturation phase of governance. In a world context characterised by an absence of leadership (Badie, 2010) and the proliferation of spheres of authority, the determination of States to be re-integrated more decisively into the international game and the resulting multiplication of informal and formal multilateral meetings attest to a governance that is looking for a second breath, especially since its admission of failure in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, and all the more so as *a contrario*, the ambient atmosphere of anxiety and instability of the international system stimulates the reflex of withdrawal.

The changes that affect this are more indicative of a search for a new balance in the processes between States and IGOs. One of the most obvious signs of seeking a re-definition of governance is symbolised by the G20's adoption of the “Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth”¹⁷, in an international system seeking re-stability. The “Seoul Development Consensus for World Growth” renews with the initial spirit of the approach of the World Bank on governance orientated towards development. It innovates, however, on several aspects. A) First of all, this document is different from the “Washington Consensus” by the nature of its authors; indeed the “Washington Consensus” was elaborated by a think tank, recapitulating conceptions shared by private actors, certain international institutions and political authorities in Washington. It is thus the result of a co-production of two categories of actors: “that of holders of a scientific capital (experts, academics ...)... and that of holders of a more directly political capital (politicians, senior officials and representatives...)” (Palau, 2007). It marked so how far an informal production created by (although not exclusively) private actors could acquire a decisive influence on international processes. On the other hand the “Seoul Consensus” is, for its part, now explicitly produced and assumed by the Member States of the G 20. However, the Seoul Declaration maintains, as a characteristic of the former perspective, the intervention of different types of actors (public and private)

in the process. B) Secondly, this paper aims to provide answers, in intention at least, to certain critics concerning the limitations of governance, including that relating to the lack of coordination amongst intergovernmental organisations, particularly by promoting complementarities to address compartmentalisation and duplication. C) More fundamentally, the explicit mention in this document of principles such as "outcome orientation", re-joined and corroborated by the same the hypothesis of Grevi on the inter-polar world, made up of deep-seated multipolarity and interdependence, and further characterised: a) by the fact that it is based on the interests of the "stakeholders"; b) that it is stimulated by challenges and issues and c) that it is process-orientated¹⁸. Furthermore, the "Seoul Consensus" refers explicitly to the first three categories of powers mentioned earlier on in the present contribution (the Advanced, the Emerging and the Developing Countries). Amongst these three categories, the Emerging Countries are mentioned particularly, attesting implicitly to their weight and their influence. Such a reference represents a confirmation both of the modification of the nature of power - more "Soft Power" by Joseph Nye - and its redistribution within the international system. This redistribution, with the increasing weight that it reveals of the Emerging Countries, confers on them, by the same occasion, a more decisive impact on the evolution of the concept of governance, by linking their approach to the role of the State. D) The picture that emerges of the place of the State, as developed in the context of the "Washington Consensus", was that of a State in withdrawal, with more limited missions (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), of an actor amongst others in the process of governance, this being focused, in a managerial logic, on economic and social issues. The "Seoul Consensus" shows a State further resolved to reintegrate into the process, this latter keeping however a managerial logic. E) Willing to reconnect, with a reference to the UNO "Millennium Development Goals", with the agenda of the 1992 report of the World Bank on development, the declaration of Seoul widens however the field of governance, notably to environmental issues. The "Seoul Consensus" differs also from the "Washington Consensus" on an important point, namely that of the method of action: instead of the single model proposed by the former approach, the need is now explicitly recognized for a strategy adapted to each case, i.e. to each State, in order to achieve the goals of development.

Ultimately, a transition has been made from a concept implicitly adopted but not assumed with regard to the place of the State in governance, to an approach explicitly stated in which the State actor not only claims openly the paternity of this but also in which he strives and assumes a role that is more assertive than before, according to a perspective which differs from "The Washington Consensus" namely, to present another model, meant to be more adapted to the challenges and realities of today.

The significant differences between the "Washington Consensus" and the "Seoul Consensus" cannot, however, prevent a certain scepticism or questions on at least two aspects. First of all, in spite of a professed desire to respond to the problems of coordination between the different bodies of governance, the "Seoul Consensus" only remains declarative without giving details on the actors and the means of ensuring its implementation. Should it be concluded that in the absence of precise indications, this is, or remains, the province of the members of the G 20, thus confirming the oligarchic character of the process but whose results, as this has already been underlined before, remain limited? This brings us to a second observation that is more fundamental. Adopting a more visible role in governance, the State now finds itself more exposed

to the demands for an evaluation of its results. If, within a few years, these do not come up to expectations, governance will once again be the object of criticism through a lack of efficiency, an efficiency which, initially, was supposed to find an answer to the crisis of legitimacy of the State actor. Yet the State, now at the forefront of governance, will find itself even more exposed to the calling into question of its legitimacy. What is at stake here is above all to know to what extent the new positioning of the State with regard to governance will enable it to avoid finding itself in the end in the past context which led to the drafting of the initial concept of governance.

All that has gone before leaves a dual image of global governance between, on the one hand, the "governing" countries, which are more numerous over these past few years, in spite of important inequalities which persist between them in elements of power and, on the other hand, the "governed" States, the targets of issues concerning development but also of the interests of the powerful. Their attempts to reposition themselves took place during a period marked by the absence, on the one hand, of what Badie calls "*a new overall vision*" (Badie, 2010) and, on the other, of leadership, two deficiencies to which global governance is having difficulty in finding an answer. It must, however, address the challenges of today which do not consist of responding to a threat from a monolithic State and ideology, but clearly to a composite whole of different natures in a world that is seeking to establish a new balance between a "realism" that is undergoing change and a "regime" that is sometimes deviated, which Battistella translates by "the improbable synthesis between a rogue Hobbes and a deviated Kant"¹⁹. The legitimacy of a changing governance and similarly of the States who are claiming a more decisive place, will depend on its capacity to contribute to meeting three major expectations: the stability of the international system, the predictability of the relationships between the actors and the effectiveness of the answers to the common global issues.

(Submitted on January 2014)

(Restated on September 2014)

(Approved for publication on August 2014)

Cite this Article

VERCAUTEREN, Pierre. From the "Washington Consensus" to the "Seoul Consensus": What role for the State in governance?

Revista Estudos Políticos: online journal published twice a year by the Laboratory for the Hum(e)an Studies (Laboratório de Estudos Hum(e)anos, Fluminense Federal University, Brazil), and the Center for the Study of Political Theory (Núcleo de Estudos em Teoria Política, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Rio de Janeiro, Vol.5, N.1, pp.74-94, December 2014. At: <http://revistaestudospoliticos.com/>

Notes

1. The concept of "governance" can be defined as the attempts of States to resist the shift from "government" to "governance" or by something in between the two, hesitant and uncertain, that characterises what is no longer exactly an exclusively inter-State system and not really a system entirely under global governance. "Governance" therefore marks this situation in which the transition from "government" to "governance", presented for a moment by certain

as unavoidable seems to mark time given the contradictions of the system and its actors, and also the resistance which is offered by States (Vercauteren, 2011, 62).

2. The thought behind the "Washington Consensus" was formulated in 1990 par John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in a document entitled: *"What Washington Means by Policy Reform"*, article on line : <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486> consulted in October 2010.

3. Such a conclusion was drawn by the Director General of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, in 2004 in Shanghai where he used the expression of the "death of the Consensus of Washington" (Maxwell, 2005).

4. This hypothesis is also followed by C. Boyden Gray, particularly when he recommends the creation of an Economic NATO (Gray, 2013).

5. This alchemy of resources must be completed by two elements underlined by Tellis: on the one hand, the capacity of the State, based on internal procedures, to extract these resources from the national society and to use them for specific political ends and, on the other hand, to influence the results (Tellis, 2000).

6. The "regime" is defined by Stephen Krasner as "*principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a given issue-area.*" (Krasner, 1995: 1).

7. Such an observation is also made, but in an even more critical way, by Weiss who speaks of the need for intensive care for the United Nations (Weiss, 2010).

8. The G 20 has doubled the number of its annual Summits since 2008 and has improved the level of the representatives of its members to the ranks of Heads of State and Governments.

9. This is what can be observed above all, particularly in the results of the G 20 in London in 2009 deciding the reinforcement of the financial means of bodies like the IMF in response to the international financial crisis. *"The agreements we have reached today, namely to triple the resources which are at the disposal of the IMF in bringing these up to 750 milliards of dollars,..."*: G 20: London Summit, Declaration of Heads of State and Governments, 3 April 2009, document on line: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/g20/declaration_010209.aspx?lang=fra consulted on 12 September 2010.

10. At the Copenhagen Summit on the Environment in December 2009, the decisive role played by the meeting of a few States (USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa) is revealing in this sense.

11. Informal group of Emerging Countries consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The strategy of the Emerging Countries in the BRICS is not without ambiguity insofar as, over and above speeches of common positions on a certain number of issues at World Conferences or within formal institutions of global governance, these States also show divisions and rivalries amongst themselves, each

seeking more his or her national interest than a common strategy for the BRICS.

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12. In 2010, the restructuring carried out in the decision-making bodies of the World Bank has made China the third stakeholder. (Hart and Jones, op. Cit. P.76).

13. This Organisation is destined above all to reinforce the coordination of policies and the "moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational, political and economic, international order". Official website of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an organisation founded in 2001: <http://www.sectsco.org/EN/brief.asp>, site consulted on 14 October 2010. This Organisation is composed of China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Ouzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Russia, as well as India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan which participate as Observer States.

14. Official website of the G 20 : http://www.g20.org/about_index.aspx

15. Fidler S. and Nicoli A., op. cit. p.90.

16. Such a statement, however, merits to be qualified. The multiplication of the analyses and multilateral meetings has led to the progression of the awareness of a certain number of medium and long-term issues, in particular in the field of environment. Even if this awareness has only generated a few results on the international scene, several States have committed themselves, although individually, to internal measures (Davenport, 2010).

17. Declaration published at the Summit of the G20 in Seoul on 11-12 November 2010. http://www.bundesregierung.de/nsc_true/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/G8G20/Anlagen/G20-erklaerung-seoul-development-shared-growth-2010-en.property=publicationFile.pdf/G20-erklaerung-seoul-development-shared-growth-2010-en

18. Grévi G., op.cit.

19. Battistella D., op. cit. p.163.

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