

Social policies and power in Brazil

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Abstract

What can explain the turning of a social policy into an electoral triumph in the greater part of South America? Or the importing by Arab, African and Asian countries of social programs based on experiments in Brazil? Our argument seeks to support the hypothesis that the cases listed above illustrate both a regional and global trend in which Brazil is the spearhead. After being regarded as “villains” in the 1970s and 1980s, several States have once again found that their social policies are serving as important “escape valves” and strategic instruments of government management. This contemporary dynamic has its roots in factors such as the following: (1) the reprocessing of the demands of the social movements are acting in a transnational manner; (2) there is a greater willingness to accept measures involving international cooperation, with Brazil as the driving-force; (3) “public diplomacy” is being strengthened, as illustrated by Brazil’s foreign policy under the presidency of Lula da Silva.

Keywords

Social policy, social movements, international cooperation, public diplomacy

What can explain the turning of a social policy into an electoral triumph in the greater part of South America?¹ Or the fact that some Caribbean countries have implemented conditional cash transfer schemes based on the experience of the Brazilian social welfare program (the 'Bolsa Família')?² Or that the ideas of the Brazilian Minister of Health for combating and treating HIV/Aids have spread to the African continent?³ Or the requests made to the Minister of External Relations, Antonio Patriota, by several leaders of Arab and Asian countries to form partnerships for agricultural cooperation with Brazil?⁴ Was the adoption of a food safety platform, inspired by the 'Fome Zero (Zero Hunger)' scheme, the reason for the successful campaign of José Graziano da Silva that led to him being elected UN Director-General of Food and Agriculture (FAO)?⁵

Our aim is to support the hypothesis that the events listed above illustrate a regional and global trend in which Brazil has been a spearhead. After being regarded as "villains" in the 1970s and 1980s, in a period characterized by the impoverishment of the *welfare state* model and the triumphant rise of neo-liberalism, certain States have found their social policies serving as important "escape valves" and strategic instruments of government management for overcoming political and economic crises in the present or future. In addition, it is increasingly evident that there is a correlation within institutional democracies between comprehensive and successful social programs and electoral rewards for the policymakers concerned.

This movement, which is apparently a concerted enterprise, has its roots in both systematic factors and regional and local areas. It is grounded on the following: (1) the reprocessing of the demands of social movements that acted in a transnational manner, and which notably took place in the second half of the 1990s; (2) a greater willingness to accept measures involving bilateral and regional cooperation, with Brazil as the driving-force; (3) the strengthening "public diplomacy" displayed in Brazil's foreign policy, particularly under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Social Policies and Crises in the State

The period 1945-1980 witnessed (particularly in some countries in continental Europe), the emergence, establishment and eventual decline of a model of public administration in which the State undertook the responsibility for providing social welfare benefits. The managerial formula, which was akin to the policies adopted by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the United States of America in the 1930s, sought to combine an observance of civil rights with policies that could bring about a relative integration of the social classes. Essentially, this modality for the political organization of society represented, at the same time, a threat to the "*laissez-faire*" liberal ideology and a progressive loss of the State's condition of "externality", in so far as it began to carry out the responsibility of income redistribution and providing the public with goods and services. This historic and institutional experience came to be known as the *Welfare State*.⁶

Running parallel with this, some countries that were peripheral to the international system, in Latin America in particular, experienced an ideological cycle of “developmentalism”⁷. This basically involved adopting economic policies aimed at industrialization and urbanization, and was supplemented by entrepreneurial State activities designed to foster national economic growth. Under the powerful influence of the structuralist ideas of the Argentinian economist, Raúl Prebisch, Latin-American developmentalism – with Mexico and Brazil as two of its main bulwarks – was conspicuous for employing a strategy that was dubbed “import substitution”. This was put into practice by the State in an attempt to strengthen its national productive sectors and break the shackles of dependence on the great centers of world capitalism.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the serious economic turbulence that afflicted the developing countries and the slowing down of the growth rates in developed countries, led to an endogenous crisis of the social State – the Welfare State of the North and the developmentalist State of the Southern hemisphere. When combined with internal issues, exogenous factors led to a wave of neo-conservatism and the idea of the minimal State. This gave rise to a concentration of income, almost throughout the whole world and led to an unprecedented increase in cases of urban violence. It also encouraged social innovation with the aim of finding ways to solve problems collectively and introduce reforms in the State. One of the underlying trends was an increasingly attachment to forms of public ownership and social control – at a time when there were signs of crisis in the social-bureaucratic model of the State and when globalization was beginning to require new, more efficient and democratic modalities of public administration.

In the mid 1990s, when the failure of the neo-liberal ideal was becoming apparent, there was a rise in movements aimed at reform, or more precisely, a reconstruction of the State. As Mariane Nassuno (1999), has pointed out, the crisis of the State was not confined to the economic-financial dimension or to questions linked to administrative autonomy. It entailed the weakening of the close ties between the State and society, especially in the modality of the relationship between the public and private sectors that prevailed in the models of development that had been adopted previously. Whereas in the past, the State was regarded as a key factor in bringing about citizenship and restraint on the part of civil society, today, they (the State and civil society) must work together with the aim of narrowing the gap between the “political” and the “social”.

In summary, the crisis of the State adds urgency to the need for efficiency and high Standards in rendering public services, *pari passu* with the spread of democratic ideals. Nobody understands how to deal with the direct effects of globalization: on the one hand there is an international demand for a better management of resources, and on the other, a greater awareness of the social requirements of the general public.

From Embedded Liberalism to Complex Multilateralism

According to a theory that is widespread in the literature, GATT (*General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*)⁸, IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)⁹ and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) form the pillars of the institutional tripartite established at the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), the implicit objective of which was to instil international relations with a liberal flavor in the aftermath of the 2nd World War.¹⁰

The United States in partnership with Great Britain (and some European countries), sponsored the creation of international institutions which were responsible for

liberalizing trade and financial transactions and preventing a serious balance of payments crisis arising among the great debtor nations. It was thus able to leverage a powerful machine of global economic governance. The so-called “embedded liberalism” was of value both as an abstract feature (the widespread acceptance of liberal values in Western countries) and a structure of coercion (mainly represented by Bretton Woods institutions).

The resilience and efficacy of this international economic order can be determined in several ways. G. J. Ikenberry noted that the strength of the settlement essentially stems from the ties that States have established with intergovernmental organizations which prevent the recurrence of “a zero sum game” (when A must necessarily lose so that B can win), in favor of a more stable and balanced way for national societies to live together. When pushed to its limits, the author believes that the establishment of the Bretton Woods system brought about, what in idiomatic terms is known as a situation that would “lock in” broad support for the great powers, or rather, lead to the imprisonment of the State actors within a determined institutional configuration. This meant there was no means of breaking free from the set path or ignoring the surrounding institutional constraints.¹¹

S. Velasco e Cruz resorted to a prosaic image — the rules for the use of a photocopier in Brazilian universities — to illustrate the capriciousness of the Bretton Woods arrangement and its by-products.¹² He reminded us that great importance was attached to the law of copyright even in peripheral societies. In his view, this ended up by being turned into a means of denying people in developing countries from having access to information and technology. As can be naturally supposed, this dynamic has widened the degree of inequality between the wealthier and poorer classes (both between different countries and within a single country).

On recognizing and defining the phenomenon of “embedded liberalism”, J.G. Ruggie also issued a warning about the limits of the Bretton Woods system. In a work published thirty years ago, the author explained that the United States of America had invested funds in a compromise package which was mainly aimed at assisting European countries (vide the Marshall Plan), but which left out the countries on the fringes of the international system. At some future time with the emergence of the “Global South”, this system could have its pillars shaken and run the risk of collapsing. In the end, the excluded will come to levy the charge.¹³

With the benefit of hindsight, it can be stated that globalization brought in its wake the need for a world governance that is able to overcome social problems on a scale that, rather than being local or national, affects the whole planet. However, as is well known, today there is still no apparatus in the form of a central world authority to coordinate and dictate these processes. For this reason, a global governance will either be effective or else will never exist. Whereas weak governments can survive throughout the world by virtue of having a particular institutional composition, governance depends on ensuring that “orderly effects” take on a material shape since there is no legal procedure. Thus, it seems appropriate to link the occurrence of “governance without government” in the current scene, with the emergence of a new order of international relations which is “complex multilateralism”.¹⁴

Let us explain: by addressing a phenomenon (and States) that can be observed by conducting a systematic analysis, complex multilateralism involves actors who have a capacity to operate beyond their local surroundings — namely: multilateral economic institutions and global social movements. As has been argued, the 1990s were the stage for

direct and bitter conflicts. These involved transnational civil society movements, especially those concerned with issues of human rights and the environment, policies fostered by the neo-liberal forces of economic institutions – the WTO, G-8, IMF, World Bank, etc.¹⁵

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The first rifts arose from the clash between the liberalizing schedules of the multilateral banks and businessmen on the one hand, and the acutely dissatisfied social movements and non-governmental organizations on the other. It was a hybrid post-liberal system that entailed worldwide managerial policies that were ambiguous and assymetrical; moreover it was able to harbor a wide range of actors – both old and new – with viewpoints that were diametrically opposed to each other. One of the most notable and widespread effects of this complex multilateralism in the international arena, has been the incorporation of particular social banners by the international organizations of Bretton Woods (notably the World Bank), and in the domestic sphere, a proliferation of State social programs.

After Washington, Brasilia¹⁶

Entities as diverse as the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United Nations Development Program (UNPD) converged in the period between 1980 and 1995. At this time, broad structural reforms were carried out at a State level which were characterized by an aggressive opening up of trade, the deregulation of domestic financial markets and capital accounts and an orgy of privatization of State assets¹⁷. These neo-liberal reforms – also known as the “Washington Consensus” – were not able to allow the Latin-Americans to play a more significant role in the world economy, as will be shown in what follows.¹⁸

There was a good deal of turbulence during the decade that culminated in the reforms of the period (1985-1995). Among other factors, these were the first years of renewed democracy in Latin America and East Europe with the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the spread of liberal-democratic ideals throughout the world. It is not by accident that in the first half of the 1990s, several experiments were embarked on in the free-trade zone,¹⁹ as well as the setting up of the World Trade Organization – WTO (1994), together with countless bilateral free trade agreements and cooperation which were welcomed in Latin America and the rest of the world.

There were clear signs of a growth in the share of exports shown in the Gross National Product figures for the whole of Latin America between 1980 and 2000. The period 1998-2001 witnessed the largest amount of privatization of State companies in Latin America. However, as could be seen, with the depletion of State assets in Latin America and the occurrence of financial crises (Brazil in 1999; Argentina in 2001), there was a sharp drop in foreign investment. There was also a greater degree of dependence on overseas funding for internal gross investment in Latin-American States. During the period 1990-2001, the average figure for Latin American countries rose from 6.7% to 28.2%. A transition took place from a “capitalist tutelage” model, which was common in the period of the Cold War, to a competitive globalized economy of “everyone for himself”.

The parallel changes that took place with regard to the guiding principles behind economic policies is not fortuitous. In the whole of Latin America, prices were stabilized in a similar way (it is worth remembering that in Brazil, this kind of inflationary control took place despite a fiscal policy which until the middle of 1999 was hardly austere). Inflation targets

which had an aura of “categorical imperatives” began to be pursued by the central national Banks. Curbing inflation was the strict condition imposed as the economic prescription of the multilateral banks – the emergency financiers of crises of liquidity in Latin America.

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As a result of the structural reforms of the Latin-American States, there was a sharp increase in the countries’ overseas debt, without, however, the hoped for social compensations. In the case of Brazil, the amount required to repay overseas debt doubled, in absolute terms, in the space of 10 years (1990-2000). In the middle of the Latin-American sub-continent the story was not very different: setting out with a debt amounting to US\$ 435 billion, for the year 1990, the overseas debt that had to be repaid reached a figure of around US\$ 750 billion by 2001 – an increase in expenditure of the order of 70%. The situation was aggravated by a concentration of global income in the OECD countries – the wealthiest countries in the world – during 20 years of structural reform in Latin America (1980-2000). To give an illustration, in the 1980s, when Latin America increased its GNP by 1.1% per year, the OECD countries increased their internal product by 3.0 % per year – almost three times the average economic growth of Latin America.

There were also clear signs of a deterioration in labor relations. The urban unemployment rates in Latin America rose sharply in the 1990s and reached record heights. Although not confined to Latin America, the unemployment problem had a dramatic effect in view of the fact that there was a serious lack of social assistance schemes to give the workers protection against financial hardship. The number of people in “informal” work, a side effect of the disintegration of labor relations, reached 45% of the active workforce in Latin America. In other words, the economy of the Latin-American States seemed to have split into an “official” and a “parallel” system.

As a result of the globalization of productive structures and the need for national economies to make competitive gains, many of the adjustments were carried out through a policy of *downsizing*, that is mass redundancies and/or reductions in working hours and wages. To be precise, the data show that, over a period of 20 years when the reforms were put into effect (1980-2000), there was a rise in the number of poor (40.5%, in 1980; 43.8%, in 1999) and the number of those in a state of indigence (about 18.5%) in Latin America. In addition, there was a growth in the absolute number of poor and indigent people both in rural areas and in the cities. Whereas in 1980, there were 136 million people in a state of poverty in the Latin-American subcontinent, by 1999, this figure had passed 211 million. During the same period, the absolute number of urban poor grew by more than 100% in Latin America. Despite an improvement in the distribution of wealth in the subcontinent in recent years, social inequality has remained at a high rate with most countries having a Gini index higher than 0.5.

In the light of the social tragedy that can be linked to the implementation of the “Washington consensus”, the reaction of Latin-American countries was to look to Brazil for leadership. Or at least, that is the view that is crystallizing: owing to its greater prominence in the international scene in the 21st Century, our country has been a source of inspiration to neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is particularly the case with regard to its style of public management which combines the principles of macroeconomic stability (independence from the Central Bank, fiscal responsibility and a floating currency exchange rate) with programs of social inclusion, conditional cash transfers and a recognition of the value of the minimum wage. The remedy is still tempered by doses of nationalism with regard to raw materials (petroleum,

natural gas, saltpeter, iron ore etc.). Countries with a sociopolitical configuration as different as Uruguay, El Salvador, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Peru and Colombia, all to a greater or lesser extent, share the principles of this newly-born “Brasília Consensus”.²⁰

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Regarding “Brazilian-style” Power

Unlike the superpowers which have imposed their will through military or economic power, Brazil represents a special and unusual case. According to the former President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the country was the first “soft power” on record, since despite exerting an influence on the world and neighboring region, it lacks the proverbial “excess of power”²¹. The obvious benchmark is the concept of soft power (in Portuguese a combination of smooth and mild qualities), which has been discussed more fully by the American political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. It refers to a non-material variant of power which is basically wielded by adopting strategies of persuasion, propaganda and image-building.²²

In exercising “soft power”, one of the instruments that is increasingly being employed is “public diplomacy”. This expression is now being applied in ways that have a meaning that is far from authoritarian and related, in a general way, to participative external policies that seek to serve the national interest by supporting the domestic market and improving the country’s reputation outside of the country. Naren Chitty, an Australian academic, has attributed the appearance of this public diplomacy to the recent dissemination of the values of civil society, which are, to a great extent, expressed in two overlapping ways:

First, a high value has been placed in liberal democracies on a healthy public sphere where politics can be discussed outside government without fear of retribution. Second, public opinion polling and the use of poll results as commodities by news organizations and political capital by political organizations, has become commonplace. As we observe, the importance that even countries that cannot be described as liberal democracies, place on public opinion in liberal democracies, has made image management an issue for them as well. (CHITTY, 2009: 316)

The author recognizes the difficulty of finding a standard concept or buzzword for the phenomenon but attempts to provide a taxonomy term that can systematize and clarify the issue. He noted that there are two key types of public diplomacy in the world today: that of the majority which is instrumental and concerned with government propaganda and that of the minority which is “dialogic” and thus able to act as a social stimulus and foster social activities.²³

The concern with the foreign influence of the State is a common factor in the government strategies of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada in the contemporary world. These countries have resorted to the modality of public diplomacy that is linked to fostering “educational” programs and giving financial aid to the poor; they are also concerned with making their countries/governments well-known beyond their borders. The measures taken by the “Anglo-Saxon” countries approximate to what Naren Chitty has called “international public relations”. For a considerable period of time, Japan has also carried out self-promotional activities throughout the world through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental or non-governmental organizations, with a special emphasis on the Middle East where, as a result, it has obtained considerable diplomatic and commercial benefits.²⁴

In Brazil, a large number of public diplomacy activities have been reported which have

been implemented by federal “autarchies”, development Banks and State corporations.²⁵ In the opinion of the Brazilian journalist, Denise Marin, “the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government has hauled at least six federal institutions to the developing world in recent years in the wake of the priority it gives to South-South relations in its foreign policy” (MARIN, 2009). By way of example, the following can be highlighted: the activities of the Brazilian Agency of Industrial Development (ABDI) in undertakings in Venezuela; the maintenance of departments at the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) as a catchment area for projects and operations in Uruguay and Great Britain; and the Caixa Econômica Federal [Federal Savings Bank] which provides loans and mortgages for urban housing both in Brazil and Venezuela; the dispatch of researchers and technical assistants from the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the National Institute of Space Research (Inpe) to encourage technical cooperation in countries in Africa, Europe and Asia; the maintenance of a department at the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) to train professionals in treating infectious diseases and planning public health care in Mozambique. In addition, there is a plan to set up a department at the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea) in Caracas, Venezuela, which is designed to allow an exchange of experiences in economic research.²⁶

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In the realm of executive federal power, it is essential to give due emphasis to the “Courses for South American diplomats” – run by the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Brazil – where the unmistakable aim is to export Brazilian values to its continental neighbors. Another initiative – the “Foreign Relations National Conference” – is primarily aimed at disclosing the driving-forces behind the position taken up by Brazil in the world. It is worth recording the willingness displayed by the then President Lula da Silva to promote the interests of Brazil on the international stage, either by means of highly publicized trips abroad or through heading business missions – symptomatically, to destinations in Latin America and Africa as a show of appreciation. At the same time, Brazilian diplomacy has also extended its tentacles within Brazilian society. As was made very clear by the spokesman, João Santana Filho, (who was responsible for running President Dilma Rousseff’s election campaign): “The pivotal center [of the election campaign] was the increase in income distribution, a reduction of inequality between regions and different people, *the inclusion of Brazil as a sovereign power in the world* and other factors. Can there be any discussion that opens up more political opportunities than this?”²⁷

The lingering impression is that by conferring a high value on public diplomacy in recent years, the Brazilian State has sought – and managed – to qualify and broaden its international presence and as a result, reduced points of friction with other countries in the region and the rest of the world. It is not by chance that it has increased its ability to influence (in a benign way) the models of public management – especially in parts of Latin America and Africa.²⁸ The exporting of social policies was only one of the most striking side effects of this new phase in the country’s international relations.

Final considerations

The argument that has been outlined in this article hinges on three key pivotal points: (1) the admission that multilateral economic institutions have relaxed their (otherwise unshakable) commitment to neo-liberal ideas and incorporated, albeit superficially, the standpoints supported by social movements of a transnational kind; (2) the observation that after the fiasco of the “Washington Consensus”, Brazil began to supply Latin America

– and why not say the rest of the developing world – a model of public administration that is worth emulating because of its recognized success in balancing conservatism in its economic policies with boldness in its social policies; (3) the confirmation that Brazil has made an increasing investment in improving its image abroad by showing the value of public diplomacy strategies carried out by different government agencies and the President of the Republic.

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In conclusion, I recall that although the structural configurations of international politics may seem data that are already known, the creative capacity of the Brazilian State and its administrative departments should be fully taken into account. This is because they have learnt how to exploit the opportunities that arose in a positive way, reverse the particularly perverse procedures of economic globalization and be in the vanguard of a new wave that entails recognizing the values of social policies for the outside world.

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Notes

1. Cf. The Economist, “Lulismo v. Chavismo”, printed edition 21.07.2011. Available on the Internet at: http://www.economist.com/node/18988516?story_id=18988516&CFID=174200387&CFTOKEN=94692902.
2. “The Bolsa Família inspires the welfare program of The Dominican Republic” (United Nations Development Program, 2012). Available on the Internet at: <http://www.pnud.org.br/gerapdf.php?id01=2741>.
3. “Cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique is going to produce batches of material against HIV” (Ministry of Health, 05.01.2012). Available on the Internet at: <http://www.blog.saude.gov.br/aids-cooperacao-entre-brasil-e-mocambique-vai-produzir-lotes-contra-o-virus-hiv/>.
4. “Arabs seek agricultural cooperation with Patriota” (Brazil-Arab News Agency, 27.09.2011). Available on the Internet at: http://www.anba.com.br/noticia_diplomacia.kmf?cod=12459080.
5. “José Graziano, responsible for the ‘Fome Zero’ Program, will be Director-General of FAO” (UOL News, 26.06.2011). Available on the Internet at: <http://economia.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/afp/2011/06/26/jose-graziano-responsavel-pelo-fome-zero-dirigira-a-fao.jhtm>.
6. For a full and far-reaching conceptual discussion of the Welfare State, see . (FARIA, 1998)

7. For a broader understanding of the issue of Brazilian developmentalism, the following work should be consulted: BIELSCHOWSKY, R.; 2002

8. The Genesis of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dates back to the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, where for the first time, the idea was entertained of setting up a formal international institution aimed at the regulation/liberalization of world trade. The stillborn proposal of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was replaced, as early as 1947, by a general agreement about customs tariffs and trade (GATT) which was signed by 23 countries. The treaty came into effect in 1948, and included the United States and [Nationalist] China as its founding members. The pro-free trade system became more prominent and wide-ranging until in 1995, it was replaced by the World Trade Organization which was a formal extension of GATT.

9. The setting up of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, eventually expropriated by the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was completed in 1945, with the implementation of two administrative systems. This involved interdependent bodies with overlapping responsibilities - overcoming balance of payments crises and cross-linking the infrastructural development of States. These were regarded as remedies for the problem of international economic coordination which led to the serious crisis in the capitalist world in the 1930s. Founded by 35 countries, the two multilateral development banks – the IMF and IBRD – laid down as a criterion that the membership must be willing to accept each other's terms as practised by them.

10. See (RUGGIE, 1982. E IKENBERRY, 2004)

11. Cf. (IKENBERRY, 2004).

12. Cf. (VELASCO E CRUZ, S. 2010).

13. Cf. (RUGGIE, 1982).

14. For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon, see: (O'BRIEN, R. et alii, 2000).

15. It is worth recalling here the accusations of practices involving slavery and child labor, sex discrimination and environmental degradation that disfigured the large international economic corporations in the 1990s and which led some of them to the verge of bankruptcy. Cf., for example, (KLEIN, N. 2002).

16. This section is broadly based on: (BELÉM LOPES, 2007).

17. Among the supporters of this reformist remedy for Latin America can be cited the following Presidents, Collor de Mello in Brazil, Menem in Argentina, Salinas de Gortari in México, Andrés Pérez in Venezuela, Fujimori in Peru and Pinochet in Chile.

18. The data provided throughout this section were taken from the report: "Democracy in Latin America: the democratic course of male

and female citizens”, drawn up by the United Nations Development Program (2004). Available on the Internet at: <http://www.pnud.org.br/publicacoes/democracia/index.php>. Accessed on 17th September, 2011.

19. The following can be cited: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC (1989), Free Trade Area of the Americas – FTAA (1990), Southern Common Market – Mercosul (1991), European Union (1992), North America Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA (1994), among other organizations.

20. The striking expression “Brasilia Consensus” was coined by Michael Shifter, President of the Inter-American Dialogue think-tank. Another term that is linked to the reforms that were implemented after the year 2000 by center-left parties in the Latin-American sub-continent, is pink tide, a reference to the dilution of the characteristic features of the old left (associated with the color “red”), which became more pragmatic by incorporating some of the policies of conservative parties in their government programs.

21. The former President stated that: “The point is that we may become the world’s first ‘soft’ superpower because of our strengthening economy, size and population alone, and this is such an historically novel phenomenon that maybe we should be on the Security Council”. Cf. the article “Making Progress: A Conversation with Fernando Henrique Cardoso”, in the journal “The American Interest” (July/August 2011). Available at: <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=998>.

22. In a recent article, Celso Amorim, Brazilian Minister of External Relations during the two presidential terms of Lula, also referred to this aspect of Brazilian foreign policy: “We are forming an attractive form of power (for example, through social progress, economic prosperity and democratic strength) and providing enlightenment (through peaceful, cooperative and centralizing policies)”. See: (AMORIM, FELDMAN, 2011).

23. According to Zöllner (2009), there is a particular practice called “Cross-cultural dialogue” – which seeks to draw Germans closer to people from other countries – particularly those from the Moslem – and in the world today, this is being regarded as a “common denominator of German practices in public diplomacy” (p. 267). If Germany can act as a mediator and promoter of inter-civilizational dialogue through its national government, this will automatically be a means of breaking away from propagandist public diplomacy. This is because it has a “dialogic” basis in which several stakeholders can form their own opinion and within limits, take part in drawing up guidelines for foreign policy.

24. Ver (OGAWA, 2009).

25. In an attempt to understand how recently democratized countries in East Europe have almost entirely resorted to public diplomacy, György Szondi (2009: 292-313) has suggested that it is a question of employing a tactic of wiping out the bloody stains of a past that was marred by an unabated authoritarianism. The clear purpose of this kind of diplomacy is to make countries trustworthy so that they are able to reap the

benefits of globalization. It is also to allow them to find a place in the large institutions and forums of the international community and thus help shape the identity of their inhabitants in the difficult transition to a representative democracy.

26. Cf. O Estado de S. Paulo, 6.12.2009, p. A13; Folha de S.Paulo, 11.12.2009, p. D22.

27. The quotation from Santana was reproduced in the article by Mario Sergio Conti ("Scandals of the Republic 1.2"), which was published in the July 2012 edition of the magazine *Piauí*; (the italics were added by me for emphasis).

28. Cf., for example: Juan Arias, "Ollanta Humala, the Peruvian Lula", *El País*, 27.07.2011. Available at: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ollanta/Humala/Lula/peruano/elpepu/20110727elpepuint_8/Tes. For a fuller and more wide-ranging discussion of the applications and limits of the Brasilia Consensus, see the article by Patrícia de Campos Mello, published in the magazine *veiculado na revista "National Interest"* (October 2011), available at: <http://interessenacional.uol.com.br/2011/10/consenso-de-brasilia/#more-466>.

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