

Habermas and the Idea of Radical Reformism: Political Justice in the Era of Post-Socialism and the Crisis of Capitalism

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Abstract

This study undertakes an analysis of the political thought of Habermas by examining the concept of *radical reformism*. The argument is conducted in two areas: (a) from the time of his first works when he was engaged in a criticism of the social-democrat project for a welfare state, Habermas argued in favor of a broadening of democratic procedures in every social sphere. This was a means of overcoming the bureaucratic nature of the State and political parties and the way the democracy of the masses is administered, and showing how this could be reflected in the economy, culture and politics; (b) from the 1980s onwards, he sought to bring about a reaffirmation of the Social-Democratic project for a welfare state at a time of crisis for social democracy and the neo-liberal hegemony. This led to the assertion of what for Habermas, was a reflective continuity of the State's plans for social welfare and was bound up with an affirmation of what social-democracy would represent after the collapse of "real socialism", its alternative and the theoretical-political stance par excellence of the non-Communist Western left. As a result, the current model of socio-political justice would clearly be centred on the reaffirmation of the welfare state, while the central driving-force of our democratic societies would be opposed to the economic *laissez-faire* policies of austerity that endowed them with legitimacy.

Keywords

Habermas; Radical Reformism; social democracy; Welfare State; Left; neo-liberalism

Preliminary Matters

In this article, there will be an analysis of the Habermasian notion of radical reformism which argues that this allows us to think of the dichotomous nature of contemporary political theory and the way it overlaps with the *realpolitik* of everyday life, namely: the question of political and economic justice against a background of crisis (in the model of capitalist development in general and the welfare state in particular); and the challenge for the left to form a theoretical-political project when faced with the demise of real socialism and the neoliberal hegemony during the 1980s and 1990s — or rather, in this case the definition of a schedule and ideology suitable for a Western left that does not share a similar model of real socialism. As I seek to show throughout the article, both areas have formed a part of the serious Habermasian reflections over a long period of time. They have defined the meaning of his work and, as I will discuss in the final section of the article, they will also be used as a theoretical benchmark to fully understand the dynamics of the present socioeconomic crisis. In particular, as I believe, it will enhance the reaffirmation of the social democrat project and show that the model of the welfare state can serve as an instrument that can be employed in combating structural unemployment, as well as revealing the decline of standards and failure to recognize the value of work in contemporary society. At the same time, it will offer an alternative to a generalized policy of austerity which has become the common jargon in neo-conservative positions and helped revive the neo-liberal discourse against the State and against social rights.

In a previous study (Danner, 2011), I explored the thesis that in the opinion of Habermas, there is a *democratic deficit* in the social-democrat project for a welfare state which overshadows much of the successful material integration put into effect by social democracy with regard to the welfare state. This will be the underlying assumption of this thesis. Basically it means that, generally speaking, the constitution of the democracies of most contemporary countries which incorporate the welfare state in their society, will have been characterized by high levels of material integration, together with the undermining of the political democratization of power. This has taken place either by means of a structural change of the public sphere (its monopolistic concentration, inclusion in the dynamics of the market, assimilation by the bureaucratic State or professional political parties etc.) or as a result of the bureaucratization of the administrative/partisan structures, because of the programmatic understanding of the welfare state which is characterized to a very great extent by the juridification and paternalism of welfare.

Since the notion of radical reformism is present in this kind of situation, it should serve as a means of questioning this democratic deficit of welfare state schemes and act as a critique of social democracy. At the same time, it also suggests a return to social democracy and the idea of a welfare state as a genuine representative of a non-communist Western left and its theoretical/political programmatic affirmation, although it has not been reformulated reflectively or supplemented by an ideal that has a radical and democratic

base. This ideal would approximate to the administrative/partisan sphere with regard to social movements and citizens' initiatives, while at the same time, opening up space to allow marginal public spheres to increase their importance when faced with the centralized public spheres of the mass media. The return to the social-democrat project of the welfare state, as Habermas believes, has become increasingly urgent since the 1980s when the crisis of the welfare state and neo-liberal hegemony, struck a powerful blow at the model of development of societies in the first world (with welfare capitalism) and beyond.

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On the basis of these considerations, I will go on to argue that these first years of the 21st Century are characterized by a radicalization of the crisis of capitalism in a general way and of welfare capitalism in particular, with the growth of material impoverishment, structural unemployment and the public indebtedness of several societies. And the current economic crisis is aggravating the conflict between the social-democratic position and the neo-liberal position. In other words, the emphasis in the former is on strong policies and directives of social evolution (which point to the strategic importance to society of the welfare state) and in the latter to the primacy of policies of austerity with a stress on *laissez-faire* economics. This requires a model of political and economic justice characterized by a reaffirmation of the social welfare state in its interventionist and compensatory capacities. Together with this, there is the need for the State and professional political parties to draw closer to social movements and for citizens' initiatives. This would represent a necessary step to resolve the current socio-economic crisis without abandoning the moral universalism that is appropriate for western modernization as a basis for "self-constitution" and the evolution of our democracies. It also involves strengthening the political praxis as a fundamental feature required for the evolution of democratic societies.

Radical reformism against Bureaucracy and the Laissez-Faire Society: for a Broader Democracy

From the time of his first writings, when addressing the issue of the democratic deficit of the planning of the welfare state, Habermas supported attempts both to overcome the technocratic nature of administrative power and overturn the political public sphere. This could only be carried out by means of radicalizing political processes — i.e. *more political democracy*, and hence finding a solution for the growing depoliticization of contemporary, public democratic spheres. This would draw the professional political parties and public administrations closer to the anxieties and legislative arguments originating from the social movements and the initiatives of citizens themselves, in a society that is either democratic or has democratizing tendencies. For this reason, the Weberian diagnosis of Western modernization which envisages a growing bureaucratization of public life (and undermines the democratic public sphere on account of its technocracy and the hegemony of *professional*, political parties, as well as for its inflexible determination expressed through the mass media, in the public sphere) is a point of departure for the theory of Habermas. This could be resolved by laying stress on a strong policy characterized by close ties between administrations/political parties and social movements/citizens' initiatives. As a result, this would extend to a political praxis in all spheres of society and lead to a comprehensive questioning of *all spheres of this same society*. In effect, radical reformism found its true meaning here. In the words of Habermas:

The only way I can see of bringing about the structural transformation of awareness in a system organized by the authoritarian welfare state is *radical reformism*. What Marx called practical-

critical revolutionary activity should be understood in this sense. This means that we should introduce reforms to clarify and publicly discuss objectives, even (and especially) if they lead to results that are incompatible with the mode of production of the established system (Habermas, 1970: 49; my italics).

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As is clear from this passage, the authoritarian character of the welfare state which Habermas tirelessly sought to conceptualize from *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere to Human Rights and Democracy*, is characterized by the distancing and superimposition of state administrations and political parties with regard to the mass public, either by means of technocracy or by subverting the political public sphere. As a result, in the heart of democratic politics itself, there was a certain conservative character which reacted coolly to the voices in the streets or signs of initiatives taken by citizens and the most wide-ranging kind of social movements. Among other things, this allowed the economic system to be given legitimacy by assimilating the mass public into the system itself (through consumerism, clientelism and wage labor). And it is this that must be combated: the undermining of the political democratization of partisan-administrative power *as one of the most serious problems of contemporary democracies*. Now, it is well-known that radical reformism leads to a *far-reaching scrutiny of sociopolitics* which extends *far beyond* the bureaucratic-administrative sphere and hence to the realm of economics itself. In effect, when continuing this passage, Habermas draws attention to the fact that the legitimacy of an economic system cannot be summarized in its productive growth or increase in the material prerequisites of welfare which it provides (and the extent to which they are provided), but to the feasibility and effectiveness of the democratic processes carried out at various levels of society – and thus not just restricted to the political sphere. In other words, it refers to broad democratic processes that also reach the economic sphere.

The superiority of one mode of production to another, cannot become apparent under the given structural conditions of technology and military strategy, whereas economic growth, the production of consumer goods and the reduction of the average working time — in short, technical progress and private well-being — are the only criteria that can be used when making a comparison with competitive social systems. Nonetheless, if the objectives are not regarded as significant forms and materials of communal and social life, the superiority of the mode of production can only be measured in industrial societies in terms of the prospects it offers for a democratization of decision-making in every *sector of society* (Habermas, 1970: 49; my italics).

It should be mentioned that in the context of the 1960s, what Habermas had in mind when he referred to pathways to modernization, was both Western capitalism (the pattern of developed industrial societies in particular) and real socialism — the Habermasian critique of the undermining of the democratization of political power — this last point can also be understood in this sense. A comment made by the author on the concept of political freedom put forward by Hannah Arendt can help us to understand this. In the section devoted to her in *Philosophical-Political Profiles*, Habermas states that with regard to this hoary old concept of political freedom, (a legacy of the ancient Greek tradition and admired and ardently defended by Arendt), the word freedom only becomes meaningful when it actively involves citizens in public affairs. This leads us to narrow our focus to the most pressing of dangers, namely: the reconciliation of both capitalism and socialism with material well-being and the undermining of political democracy. In reality, this concept of political freedom should alert us:

[...] to the danger that the revolution can, strictly speaking, betray its purpose when it is apparently reaping the benefits of success. *Both in the East and the West* the initial revolutionary impulse runs out of steam in its attempt to eradicate misery effectively and in its administrative maintenance of an economic growth that is exempt from social conflicts. These systems can be structured as democracies of the people without, for this reason, ensuring even a modicum of freedom. (Habermas, 1986: 204)¹.

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For this reason the issue of socio-political emancipation acquires a new stress in Habermas. It cannot be understood (on account of its sui generis association, which is appropriate for developed industrial societies that hover between economic development and the undermining of political democratization), as primarily a means of overcoming poverty, unless it can point to the democratization of power as its key objective (and as something that encompasses its other objective):

When it is more established in developed societies, there is a possibility of reconciling repression with well-being; in other words, it can satisfy the demands made to the economic system without necessarily satisfying genuinely political demands, and thus the accent is more likely to shift from the eradication of hunger to emancipation (Habermas, 1986: 328-329)².

As I argued in my doctoral thesis, the emphasis on a democratic deficit in the planning of a welfare state that Habermas dwells on so insistently, raises the notion that in the democracies of Western peoples (in particular, as Habermas believes, in developed societies), poverty will have been eliminated or significantly reduced in proportion to the extent that the democratization of political power has been bolstered. This includes the fact that there will not be an automatic nexus between resolving the problem of poverty and the consolidation of democratic processes in the sphere of power. There could be social democracy or a considerable degree of social justice without there necessarily being a consolidation of political democracy at the same time. In this particular situation, emancipation would mean, “[...] a participatory transformation in patterns of decision-making” (Habermas, 1986: 331)³. It should be noted – this is a crucial part of my argument – that the patterns of decision-making which require democratization are more comprehensive than administrative- legislative structures.

The question remains even more pressing in the resumption by Habermas, near the beginning of *Human Rights and Democracy* (Habermas, 2003a: 12-13), of a statement made in *Theory and Practice*. This passage refers to this argument, sketched out earlier, that both Western capitalism and real socialism can be characterized by an impressive rate of economic growth, together with the establishment of a monetary-administrative complex of a holistic character that would determine how to achieve a combination of social integration and the undermining of the democratization of political power. Real socialism would achieve this in an explicit and direct way, by means of a one-party dictatorship and an authoritarian State; in developed capitalist societies, this social integration and undermining of political democracy would occur in an indirect way through the consolidation of the technocratic nature of the State and professional political parties and the destructuring and overturning of the political public sphere. This is how the passage from *Theory and Practice* is expressed (and repeated near the beginning of *Human Rights and Democracy*):

Marx [...], as the legacy of later Marxism, effectively disbelieved, after carrying out an ideological critique of the bourgeoisie Law of the State [...] both the idea of legality itself and the intention of Natural Law as such, that ever since the link between Natural Law and revolution has been

dissolved. The parties of the internationalized civil war have divided this heritage between themselves with fateful unambiguity: *the one side has taken up the heritage of revolution, the other the ideology of natural law* (Habermas, 1987: 116; my italics).

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In the theoretical-political tradition of classical liberalism, later superseded by neo-liberalism, individual rights of a negative character and centred on Lockean theories of property, have set the tone of the theoretical-practical praxis. In Marxism, the revolution against the bourgeois values of the State became the keynote. Both the positions separated fundamental human rights from democracy in so far as they undermined the broad processes of democratization. In the position adopted by the former, the latter was reduced to *a means of protecting those rights*. Hence the State was regarded as a nightwatchman and a self-referential economic sphere that was not only detached from political control but also from socialization, and characterized by a possessive individualism. In the latter case, there was a radicalization of the revolution *against the system of rights*, to the extent that the dictatorship of a one-party system was opposed to the democratization of the power structures and shielded the State and politics from any democratic base.

As a result, real socialism, which remained as the legacy of the revolution, destroyed human rights in its name; and liberalism, (the legatee of natural rights), joined the revolution (understood as progressive politico-economic democratization) in the name of human rights. Now what was the outcome of this? In the normative content of political modernity, that is the French Revolution, which is styled in its "Magna Carta" as a modern revolution – in particular that which became the paradigm of: *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* (1786) and *The French Constitution* (1791) – ,human emancipation involved a political and social revolution. This kind of revolution led to the progressive democratization of power structures and the levelling down of social conditions and as a result, of the hierarchies (or status quo) among the citizens. And these revolutions were justified both through an awareness of the historical and class-based nature of their institutions and social hierarchies and by the spread of universal rights. The bond between natural rights and revolution thus intertwined the spread of universal rights, the democratization of political power and an equal sharing of social conditions among everybody – or in other words, it was an extended democracy in political, socio-economic and cultural terms.

In that case, as Habermas wants, the way modernity is understood by the liberals and socialists is exactly the close tie between natural rights and revolution that was lost. In other words, the ideal of a progressive democratization of political power and social life was *partly adopted by both groups* but only with regard to the question of material integration. In the case of the socialists, bourgeois democracy was generally understood as purely and simply a superstructure grounded on the reproduction of the dominant classes that originated from the socio-economic sphere. On the other hand, in the case of the liberals (in the true Lockean style), the defense of fundamental individual rights based on furthering the interests of the *bourgeois*, suggested a reductionist conception of rights. This instilled a negative conception of politics and to the State being consigned to the role of nightwatchman, with pride of place being given to *laissez-faire* economics (and individual rights being erected as a barrier against politics and against the State).

In this respect, in the case of liberalism, the restrictive conception of human rights slides into a political conservatism and the reduction of the economic sphere to a *laissez-faire* system and possessive individualism. This diminishes its legitimacy either to allow itself to be influenced by society or to accept the ideal of socialization and economic equality

for everyone, whereas in the case of socialism, the evolution of political democracy leads to it being destroyed by the dictatorship of a single party.

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In this way, the legacy of socialism and liberalism has been that of a dissociation between social democracy and political democracy. In other words, they have attained a high degree of material development while at the same time undermining the process of democratizing political power (and not merely State power). In both cases, processes of full democracy are rendered impossible on account of the subjugation of civil society to the arrogance of technocratic institutions and bureaucratized parties. In the case of liberalism it is through the self-referential nature of the economy which cannot undergo intervention from political mechanisms from outside unless they are endowed with their own non-political and non-normative rationale. As a result, this obstructs the influence of the political sphere and they remain as if they were immune to any general concerns of the social world.

If we return to that passage in the context of *Human Rights and Democracy*, it can be seen that Habermas' gaze was fixed on the withering away of real socialism, which clearly denoted the weakness of a lost cause: he did not know how to integrate society in a democratic way; he "socialized" production but shielded the politico-administrative power of these same processes of democratic socialization – as a result, his ideal died with him.. On the other hand, Habermas, was faced with the shortcomings of socio-economic modernization which was putting the social integration of Western democracies at risk and in reality, jeopardizing the worldwide integration of society in terms of economic globalization. In effect, in the case of the latter, the 1990s is the decade when there was a systematic dismantling of the Welfare State and hegemonic economic globalization, which this author refers to as being of great concern in the context of *Human Rights and Democracy*, where one can find the passage from *Theory and Practice*.

For this reason, the winning party – the capitalist West heralded by political liberalism – cannot celebrate its triumph over real socialism enough. This is also made clear from the fact that the dissociation between economic development and socio-political democratization has left its real mark on the Marxist-socialist diagnosis that has been carried out for nearly two centuries: the phenomenon of poverty and the undermining of political democracy, as Marxism had already claimed, is a serious setback to any effective means of endowing wide sections of the population with human dignity. It also casts a tragic shadow on the political sphere which by means of a miserly conservatism curbs the socio-political processes of emancipation in favor of the status quo (Flickinger, 2003: 11-15). In this case, the victory of the liberal-capitalist West over socialism should not allow us to overlook the fact that it has particular problems which *are not eliminated* by the end of real socialism. The crisis of the Welfare State, the end of social labor and an unequal economic globalization, all draw attention to the fact that even in the West, to a considerable extent, there is a dissociation between socio-economic progress and political democracy.

This is of crucial importance. In an interview in the mid 1980s, concerning the crisis in the Welfare State and the end of social labor, Habermas made clear that against the backdrop of an emancipatory politico-democratic praxis, this entailed a dual challenge: on the one hand a radicalization of the democratizing structures of political power and on the other, an extension of these democratic processes to the job market.

In reality, the problem seems rather one of how capacities of self-organization can be sufficiently developed in autonomous public spheres in a way that the objective processes of forming the

desire for a thriving world guided by the value of use, is reduced to the systematic imperatives of economic power and the apparatus of the State. [...] I cannot imagine how this can be done without abolishing the capitalist labor market and without establishing political parties in a democratic and radical way in public spheres (Habermas, 1997: 221-222).

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With regard to the second point – that is of achieving an approximation by means of the focal points of democracy (lying somewhere between civil society, its social movements and the initiatives of its citizens), the key question entails avoiding the “democratic deficit” of the Welfare State project. This is founded on the technocratic moulding of political praxis in winning the loyalty of the people to – and on behalf of – the administrative system. This curbs any democratic controls and influences they may have on society and replaces the effective participation of the people, with technocracy and political parties. According to Habermas, in an entirely secularized era, only radical democratic processes can ensure legitimacy and sustain party-based administrative power, as well as making its own social evolution viable. In effect, democracy exists because of the interrelationship of the voices and everyday arguments in the streets in their links with the institutions. It is not just because of the bureaucratic, administrative and partisan institutions in so far as, without the voices and participation of the streets, the effectiveness of democracy cannot be assured – but it *is a question of politics and political participation*.

Hence, with regard to the crisis of the Welfare State, radical democratic processes can wholly transform the pursuit itself of socio-economic modernization which – and this is the great concern of Habermas – has occurred in a practically autonomous way under democratic control. The crisis of the, to some extent, powerful process of modernization is a crisis of a lack of any democratic radical sense in the political procedures of decision-making. This, either directly or indirectly, strengthens both the autonomy of the institutions and professional political parties (which end up by being largely dominated by class power and thus makes politics the hostage of money) with regard to the status quo of an unequal and deeply divided society – and which explains the need to face this problem.

With regard to this first point, it is an intriguing idea to regard the abolition of the capitalist labor market as a condition for the extension of democratic procedures to the economic sphere and beyond, to the administrative sphere. What does it imply? It cannot be the establishment of communism in so far as Habermas does not believe that socialism, pure and simple, involving the means of production, can resolve the problem of the “deficits” linked to economic modernization. This is not to mention the politico-economic problems arising from this question that are confronted by real socialism, which cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that the crisis of social labor (with its ideal of ensuring full employment) subverts the meaning of productive and meritocratic culture which lies behind the programmatic elements of the Welfare State and laid the foundations of the liberal model of society and man.

In this case, to the extent that salaried work is, in the context of developed industrial societies, a scarce asset, the whole productive culture must be reconfigured so that it is based on the model of socio-economic modernization with regard to mass democracy. This involves social security schemes which although important, *are insufficient*. Now, the extension of economic democratic processes to the productive sphere suggests the need, for example, of committed forms of cooperation, a separation of income from work, or consumption and work, among other factors. I will not discuss possible alternatives in more specific terms. What concerns me is to underscore the fact that

according to Habermas, the crisis of social labor will open up a huge gap. It will radicalize the pressure of the democratic forms of productive management and the processes of social integration which are no longer purely and simply grounded in a culture that is productivist and liberal/individualist — since a new kind of distribution of wealth has also found its meaning here. This reflection is made clearer by a passage from *Human Rights and Democracy* in which the author, on refusing to accept the feasibility of turning back, (as advocated by neoliberalism as a means of overcoming the crisis of social labor, by espousing certain *laissez-faire* principles), accuses social democracy of having reduced social integration to the level of encouraging private rights.

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It can be rightly said that the Welfare State should not reduce 'emergency guarantees' of private autonomy with regard to the granting of protection and social security by the State; and it is no use evoking 'the understanding of freedom of the Western liberal'. This is because a well-grounded criticism aimed at the theoretical self-understanding of bourgeois rights forbids any going back to the liberal paradigm of human rights. On the other hand, the weaknesses of the Welfare State can be explained by the fact that it is still captive to this critique and hence to the reductive premises of private rights (Habermas, 2003b: 145; the italics are those of Habermas)⁴.

Now it is precisely this reductionism of private liberal rights which leads to this separation of economic development and radical democracy. This is the case in so far as it conceives the economic sphere not only as central in terms of social evolution (which it really is), but also as being essentially determined by private rights. As a result, the economic sphere, *viewed as a private sphere*, has been depoliticized, as well as being pervaded with individualism and productivism, grounded on the figure of the *bourgeois*. The most immediate results, and hence benefits are that the democratic *praxis* has been detached from the economic life, together with any ideas of the "socialization of production". In addition, following the liberal line of argument, it puts at risk individual freedom and individual private property (property basically understood as *individual*), which are basically determined by the meritocracy of the labor market. But why is socialization fairly and squarely in open confrontation with individual property? Or in other words, is the capitalist economy at odds with democracy, at least to some extent? Finally is it predominantly private?

In this respect, the Welfare State has sought (by means of social politics) to promote the interests of the *bourgeois* on the basis of the centrality of private rights and has thus repudiated any idea of strengthening or extending radical processes of democracy, whether in the political or economic sphere. This is in effect a mistake for which Habermas cannot forgive social democracy. In his view, it was a grave error to have reduced social integration to the politics of compensatory domination by renouncing this extension of democratic processes and shifting it to the economic-social sphere; it was also wrong for political power to have a binding commitment to maintaining the status quo when it is determined by the socio-economic sphere. As a result, politics has been restricted to a systematic form of stabilization brought about through social integration; this is based on social assistance programs which involve a great deal of bureaucracy, and which is the responsibility of professional political parties, institutions and technocratic practices. In other words, the programming of the Welfare State did not succeed in dispelling the liberal view that the production of "socialization" was at odds with individual property (and thus did not overcome the negative understanding of fundamental individual rights as being grounded on property). In addition, it kept intact an economic structure that reproduces inequality over a period of time and which has gradually caused administrative

problems (both fiscal and with regard to legitimacy) to the Welfare State itself and left it in a tight spot (Habermas, 2001a: 494-495). As a result, the programming of the Welfare State is highly depoliticized, since (as shown in *The Theory of Communicative Action*), it underlines the role of the client in State bureaucracies and of the consumer in the marketplace, as the price of political citizenship and democratization in the economic realm.

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However, the concomitant extension of democratic processes to the economic sphere is no longer an unfounded concern in a reformist program. In reality, the “democratic deficit” that planning the Welfare State entails and the end of social labor, were paving the way to the demands of radical democracy. Moreover, social integration was no longer restricted to promoting *bourgeois* rights. This was because, on the one hand, the administrative sphere needs the supplementary rules provided by civil society and on the other, the means of socializing production become necessary at a time when social integration cannot be carried out fairly and squarely in the framework of private rights. This radical reformism aims at extending the basis of democracy either in what regards political power or something beyond this – in particular to the economic sphere.

As a result, radical reformism was effectively a revolutionary step which made possible a renewal of modernity that stemmed from an ideal of radical democracy. Here modernization was confronted with its merits and defects and thus found an equilibrium point that was founded on democracy and lay between systematic development which is absolutely necessary and socio-political integration, which is also essential. In reality, when the basis of democracy, understood in its broadest sense, is extended beyond the realm of politics and passes through culture to the economic-productive sphere, it is able to reformulate a kind of modernity where there is a wealth of emancipatory opportunities. However, it is moulded by the systematic rationale of a “monetary-administrative complex” of a holistic character which is to a great extent, autonomous and extraneous to the democratic evolution of society. For this reason, radical reformism is opposed to the growing trend (the characteristic of contemporary democratic societies, for increasing bureaucracy and to the fact that there is an administrative-party set apart from social movements and the legislative citizen’s initiatives. As well as this, it is against the neo-liberal *laissez-faire* economy in so far as it seeks to place democratic politics (conducted in terms of a relationship in which the State, political parties and social movements are interwoven) at the heart of social evolution. This raises a serious issue that is wide-ranging and concerns a progressive extension of democratic processes in every sector of society. Bureaucracy does not solve the problems of social integration but the denial of politics and a citizen’s social rights and the championing of *laissez-faire* economics, undermines important democratic achievements in terms of politico-cultural and socio-economic integration.

As Habermas believes, this radical reformism must be taken into account in renewing the social-democratic planning of the Welfare State, in particular when in the 1980s and 1990s there was a political weakening of the social-democrat and labor parties and in most Western countries, a practically undisputed hegemony of neo-liberal and neo-conservative positions. For this reason, the demise of real socialism, added to the neo-liberal hegemony, is breathing new life into social-democrat reformism. This is occurring to such an extent that there do not remain many alternatives to disillusionment with the ideas of the left represented by this same real socialism, nor to the overwhelming neo-liberal hegemony and politico-cultural conservatism. In other words, there is a future for a non-communist Western left: the pursuit of the social-

democratic planning of the Welfare State founded on a democratic base can effectively employ the term 'radical reformism' as its motto.

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A non-Communist left in the West

The work by Habermas, "The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking: What does Socialism Mean Today?" (my italics), written on the occasion of the reunification of Germany and the disintegration of real socialism, can, in effect, give a precise idea of the Habermasian position with regard to the following:

- (1) the future of the Left in Western Europe,
- (2) the objectives which it must set out
- (3) the method to be employed for it .

Habermas, here sketches out an alternative to hegemonic neo-liberalism based on the renewal of social democracy but in a way that can prevent the kind of "democratic deficit" which has been characterized by bureaucratization and welfare paternalism. Thus, Habermas regards social democracy as expropriating a genuine theoretical-political plan from the non-communist Left in the West. This involves adopting a radical democratic stance which extends from the political to the economic sphere. It has also put an end to the dual effect of the democratic deficit of the old Social Democrats, that undermines the political democratization of the power structures and the acceptance of structural unemployment, while being accompanied by problems concerning the inner dynamics of the productive processes. In addition, it abandons a democratic stance and the integral forces of solidarity within this sphere — as can be seen, a democratic form of socialism must be a real brand of social democracy.

With the bankruptcy of real socialism, what remains for the Left and the political movements influenced by the ideal of a Western Europe? (Habermas, 2001b: 127). Have these positions reached their twilight with the end of real socialism? The answer is yes, if one understands by the *ideal of the Left* this exact project of real socialism or the way it is shaped. Here both the political centralization of a one-party dictatorship and a form of collective production that is entirely planned, show their failure in terms of social evolution. With regard to the first point, political authoritarianism has led to the destruction of effective democratic processes. In view of this, this ideal died with the demise of 'real socialism' — in particular with regard to fostering a productive socio-economic organization and a democratic political organization.

As a result, the triumphant liberal model has cause to celebrate the failure of one of the socio-political systems that was most threatening to its survival. But does it really have the right to do so? As Habermas makes clear in the passage quoted above, and as he was to go on to do at the beginning of *Human Rights and Democracy*, the socio-political situation in industrial societies that have evolved in the West is not encouraging and thus does not allow this feeling of vainglory to prevail. In the last decade of the 20th Century, the dismantling of the Welfare State and the spread of economic globalization were already the key factors which compelled these societies to revise their ideas about their social, political and economic basis, as well as how the very pillars of the world order could be established in a climate of economic globalization. For this reason, the fall of the bitter foe is not much cause for celebration: the growth of structural employment and increasing social inequality within these societies, not to mention the socio-economic

and ecological problems at a global level, make it abundantly clear that the particular problems of capitalist socio-economic modernization have not been solved by the end of real socialism. By assuming this, the neo-liberal understanding was not seeing the beam in its own eye. (Habermas, 2001b: 135-137).

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In the light of this, the social democrat plan for the Welfare State is attracting renewed attention and new light is being thrown on it. In reality, it helps clarify the problems that arose at the end of the century with regard to the challenges and opportunities of the Left. The commitment to the Welfare State has been of crucial importance in straightening out the contradictions and dilemmas caused by capitalist economic modernization in the industrial societies of the West. According to Habermas, at the beginning of the 2nd World War, the reformist parties “[...] became pragmatic and operated outside of their theories [...]” (Habermas, 2001b: 143) – they had great success in establishing an agreement between capital and work which was embedded in the structure and programming of the Welfare State. And this commitment is deeply rooted in these societies. However, the radicals of the left – with an eye turned on the model represented by real socialism – has always underestimated the full extent of the social and political effects of introducing the Welfare State.

It is this successful introduction of a Welfare State that cannot be ignored, especially if one revises one’s ideas about the goals of the left and its emancipatory theoretical-political planning. In the opinion of Habermas, European social democracy has led to: (1) a restructuring of the capitalist economy and (2) a reformulation of the concept of the State itself, by turning it into a social and democratic State of human rights, with a broad-based social integration and political pluralism. The commitment embedded in the social-democrat project finds its support and meaning here (Habermas, 1991: 132-133). In this way, the social democratic project for the Welfare State represents a model that is very beneficial in the West and for the Western Left in that it aspires to an emancipatory theoretical-political ideal. This is particularly the case in so far as it realistically assesses the framework of the kind of socialism that effectively exists. It is really in its twilight, and represents a great challenge, at a time when neo-liberalism prevails in this same West and is confronting the Left in its struggle against the Welfare State and the social rights of citizenship. The great enemy of the Western left is represented by hegemonic neo-liberalism (for this reason, Soviet communism is not an exemplary model for this Western left); this means the main objective of the left is to offer an alternative to neo-liberalism and renew the Welfare State project.

In view of this, the non-communist left of Western Europe should have regretted the demise of real socialism. And the reason for this is that for them, the theoretical-political benchmark is not – and strictly speaking never has been – what is represented by real socialism but rather what is represented by the social-democrat model of the State. In the light of this, I would like to put forward the argument that, in the opinion of Barbara Freitag, the non-communist left of Western Europe was understood by Habermas, as being in an inordinately theoretical position (for example, Offe, Bourdieu, Castoriadis, Touraine and, of course, Habermas himself, who is cited by this thinker), which can be attributed to their academic assimilation of Marxism (Freitag, 2005: 178-180). In the case of Habermas, this clearly entailed adopting a theoretical approach as a means of questioning the academic left. However, it is also a political project in its involvement of the non-communist left and as a result, has practical implications aimed – as is the case of a social theory which combines theory and practice – at the interpretation of the present and suggesting practical activities as alternatives.

This is extremely important. This kind of theoretical-political project of the left, backed up by an intellectual pursuit of the social-democrat project of the State, makes it possible to give an affirmative response to the following question. With the end of real socialism, did any political programming remain or any theory that had been expropriated by the Left? In reality, the left and its theoretical-political programs still have significance, if account is taken of the social-democrat State planning, or at least if they are given renewed attention from a reformist standpoint and in terms of radical democracy. The non-communist Left which Habermas discusses, has changed by adopting a theoretical-political social-democratic position and is now assuming the mantle of the social and democratic State of human rights. Moreover, this sets out from an ideal of radical democracy in a way that overcomes the democratic deficit of this Welfare State planning, while at the same time offering a theoretical-political alternative to neo-liberalism.

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In particular, this stress on a kind of social-democracy as a genuine representative of a non-communist Western left (as the legacy of bourgeois emancipation movements, as well as proletarian-socialist movements and their ideas about renewing Welfare State planning in a reflective way), should take account of both the democratic deficit of the old social-democracy and the neo-liberal hegemony (as I have been highlighting throughout this article). In the first case (the deficit), this involves overcoming the fact that the democratization of political power structures has been undermined. This problem has arisen because they have prevented the democratic processes from being extended beyond the political sphere that is centred in the State itself. At the same time, they have impeded the democratic processes from extending beyond the political sphere centred on the State itself and put into effect by professional political parties (setting out from a structural change of the public sector when viewed in a negative sense). In the second case (the hegemony), it provides a theoretical-political alternative to the dismantling of the Welfare State, which was implicit in the neo-liberal positions. In reality, a consistent response to neo-liberalism depends on making a correct assessment of the challenges and merits of the social-democrat project for a Welfare State, or rather it entails an effective reformulation of social-democracy which will lead to its renewal.

As Habermas makes clear, the technocratic nature of power, and party politics, the subversion of the public-political sphere and the politics of social assistance, involve mass democracy of a Western kind. This displays “[...] the features endowed with a controlled and driven legitimacy [...]” (Habermas, 2001b: 143), which have their origins in a democratic deficit that is embedded in social-democrat planning, both with regard to the political sphere and to a greater extent, (here in particular) to the economic sphere. Hence social-democracy has paid a double price for its success in terms of the Welfare State: it has renounced radical democracy at the same time that it has accepted structural unemployment and the psycho-social pathological condition caused by the deficits embedded in economic, capitalist modernization. These can be discharged by means of social politics but not completely settled in so far as the problem of the loss-making economic structure itself is not being tackled. The Welfare State, with particular regard to the economy and civil society, has stabilized the capitalist economic framework accompanied by a technocratic and depoliticizing social integration. It should thus be no surprise that the memory has remained latent in Western Europe, on the part of the non-communist Left (which Habermas himself represented in an exemplary way), that Socialism “[...] once meant more than state-welfare policies” (Habermas, 2001b: 144). It is exactly at this point that the theoretical-political stance of a radical reformism, (understood as the reformulation of social-democracy) can be contextualized in a way that allows it to overcome these deficits.

In the view of Habermas, the collapse of real socialism can be interpreted positively by the Western Left to the extent that the ideas and programs linked to it have proved to be illusory and inefficient and must thus be abandoned. The immediate consequences of this are that when this same Western Left reconsiders its theoretical-political position, it can break away from this uncomfortable association with real socialism in a dichotomous way. First of all, by virtue of the fact that it never had any link with it – in fact the Western left has always been critical of Stalinism in particular and communism in a general way.

In the second place, it concerns the real focus of attention – that is the Welfare State and democratic social rights; (or the State of social well-being), which are in an acute crisis and undergoing a process of being dismantled. And this is the key point: by concentrating on criticizing and reformulating social democrat Welfare State planning, the Western left has assumed the mantle of this same social democracy by undertaking it themselves it, while at the same time, overcoming the democratic deficit of the Welfare State project by finding a way to understand both it and its accompanying problems. In the same way, one can understand the impossibility of extending the democratic processes to the economic/productive sphere, especially when faced with the crisis of the society of labor and the consolidation of structural unemployment.

This means that a social-democrat position which is representative of an authentic Western non-communist Left, is situated at the crossroads of modern bourgeois revolutions and proletarian-socialist movements. This is true to the extent that in the former case the democratic State ideal of social rights is appropriated and in the latter, an ideal of a socio-political ideal is characterized by a wide-ranging democratization of power. In other words, as a project of the Left, social democracy encompasses *the combination* of a progressive democratization of the political and socio-economic spheres. In the former case, there is also a need to deal with the entrenchment of socio-economic democratization (owing to a restrictive and negative liberal conception of the State of social rights). In the latter case (i.e. the socio-economic sphere), it underlined the ideal of a democratic State of social rights as the *medium* through which this kind of democratic evolution of society can take place. It involves a more active participation between the State and political parties with social movements and citizens' initiatives – which is the real meaning of a radical democracy. This can be put into effect by the renewal of social-democrat State planning and allowing a reformist criticism of a radical nature to play a fundamental role. A social-democracy as a theoretical-political project of the (non-communist) left, in the words of Habermas:

[...] converted socialist ideas into a radically reformist kind of self-criticism of a capitalist society which, in the forms of a mass democracy articulated in terms of the State of social rights and the Welfare State, led to its shortcomings as well as its strong points (Habermas, 2001b: 156)⁵.

According to Habermas, *there is no third alternative*, that can go beyond social democracy and neo-liberalism, in particular on account of the demise and ineffectiveness of the communist project represented by real socialism. The reason for this is that, for example, if one goes beyond social-democracy, one falls into neo-liberalism or, at the other extreme, into an unsustainable communist position (which in any event, has gone bankrupt) In effect, social democracy can in this regard, be understood as allowing political and economic democracy to be achieved concurrently in so far as ideas are appropriated that have emerged from bourgeois revolutions and proletariat-socialist movements so that they can be employed to establish a social and democratic State of human rights.

At this point a radical reformist critical stance can be adopted for both a political program which puts political and economic democracy into effect and a reformist theoretical position. The focus of this last point is the renewal of an intellectual position of the left for reflectively undertaking the Welfare State project within the framework of the democratic State of social rights. This must overcome the democratic deficit of the Welfare State in two respects (the undermining of the power structures of political democracy and the inability to extend democratic processes to the socio-economic sphere in a general way), by offering a theoretical-political alternative to neo-liberalism at the same time.

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Radical reformism, when understood from the theoretical-political stance of a social-democracy as a genuine project of the left, has asserted the ideal of a radical democracy – which confronted the fact that the power structures of political democratization had been undermined. This was because it involved the administrative-party sphere, social movements and citizens' initiatives in charting the course of the political praxis, by establishing focal points of "direct democracy" and allowing inclusive criticism and discussion in the public-political sphere. These processes were thus not restricted to professional political parties, or determined by guidelines drawn up by the mass media. In addition, radical reformism interrogated the economic-social sphere in an attempt to draw a parallel between exchange values which are really necessary for the dynamics of the market and utilitarian values which are indispensable for social evolution and the satisfaction of social needs. With regard to the second point, in interrogating the socio-economic sphere through economic democracy, there is a need to revise our ideas about the social labor at a time when structural unemployment and even the problems caused by the dynamic capitalist economy, threaten the integrity of what is vital in the world (and risk undermining the equitable processes of social integration that have highlighted the model of developed industrial societies compared with other societies).

When the social and democratic State of human rights is taken as a focal point, the theoretical-political stance of a social-democrat Left is able to question how political and economic democracy can be achieved, when they *are dependent on each other*, without disrupting the Welfare State. This is because the conditions of capitalist modernization and the regulatory system which has been successfully embodied in contemporary democracies, prevent a return to the conditions preceding the Welfare State. As a result, owing to the central position of this same social and democratic State of human rights, it must be tempered by an ideal of radical democracy. This is a theoretical-political position of a radical reformist nature that has become absolutely fundamental for the Left and its theoretical-political ideal par excellence: "[...] the single eye of the needle through which everything must pass" (Habermas, 2001b: 156-157). In fact, in the opinion of Habermas, only a reflective pursuit of the State planning of the Welfare State, as a *theoretical-political ideal* of the Left, can lead to a successful outcome that combines political and economic democracy. He states this in emphatic terms:

Among us, only the pursuit of the project that is meant by the Welfare State but has been converted into a reflective position, can lead to something akin to social democracy – a definitive neutralization of the undesirable consequences ranging from the capitalist labor market to the eradication of real unemployment (Habermas, 1991: 135).

The author believes that this is even more evident at the time when the dismantling of the Welfare State is leading to an aggravation of problems linked to economic justice in developed democratic societies. Strictly speaking, these problems have been overcome

on account of the success of the Welfare State programs. And it is precisely the role played by it in its declared commitment to the Welfare State, that has underlined the fact that the point of departure of a theoretical-political program of the Left, has to a very large extent, consisted of embarking on this kind of Welfare State project at a time when its crisis and dismantling give ample illustration of the contradictions inherent in capitalist economic modernization. In the same way, it would also explain the effectiveness of the compromise between capital and labor, were it not for the fact that it was the point of departure for a reformist theoretical-political praxis in the current situation of contemporary democracies.

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At present, the Welfare State compromise which used to adhere to social patterns, forms the essential feature of what any policies must abandon. This emerges from a consensus about political and social ends in the following ironic words of Offe: "The more the image of actually existing socialism is painted in depressing and desolate colors, the more we are becoming 'communists', in so far as we do not allow anybody to deprive us of concerns about current affairs and the horror provoked by global catastrophes and misguided developments"⁶ (Habermas, 2001b: 150)⁷.

In this respect, Habermas believes, it should be made clear that there is no model of capitalist development that can win the battle against real socialism. The capitalist model "[...] with regard to the Welfare State, was put to domestic use in the favorable circumstances of the post-war period [...]" (Habermas, 2000: 173). Now, it is exactly this model of capitalist development – and not capitalism *tout court* – which has undergone a clear process of being dismantled (Habermas, 2000: 173). As a result, the social democratic position itself which was its advocate, has been losing ground. Hence it is here that a theoretical-political program of the left can adopt the "normative content" of the Welfare State at a time when the utopias of the left are all turning to forge a necessary link between political democratization and economic justice. Strictly speaking, these have been bundled together – or at least assumed to have been – by the Welfare State. The correlation between political and economic democracy in any event, has been and should continue to be the driving-force behind the theoretical-political stance of the left so that it can go beyond Soviet-style socialism. This is because it seeks to react against the dismantling of the Welfare State and the crisis of social labor and thus serve as a counterpoint to neoconservatism.

Final Considerations

It is a striking fact that, as I believe, the constitution of contemporary democracies owes a great deal to the social-democratic model of the Welfare State in a tripartate form: (a) the affirmation of a strong policy, driven by the kind social expansion which is given precedence within the *laissez-faire* economic system; (b) the stress on the social rights of citizenship as the fundamental features required for an all-encompassing and equitable social integration. This must be ensured by political means based on achieving a permanent compromise between capital and labor and (c) the politicization of civil society with its social movements and citizens' initiatives offers a politico-regulatory system that supports the activities of the professional political parties. This is carried out in a way that constantly calls into question the political constitution, and socio-economic and cultural framework of these same democratic societies. Now, the constitution of contemporary democracies owes a great deal to the social-democrat model of the Welfare State precisely because this compromise between capital and labor (which is rooted in the framework of the Welfare

State) is intimately bound up with a prescriptive understanding of democracy and the prescriptive understanding that citizens have of democracy. It is in this way that there can be an understanding of what a democratic society must offer to ensure socialization and “subjectivization”, which foster both individual well-being and a minimal community relationship among its members, as well as the means to achieve this. It is a kind of “humanization” in the strict sense, and hence the most fundamental feature of the kind of democracy that can be fostered in an institutional way.

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Here, the way political institutions organize social life together with the ideological doctrine of the political parties seeking power, is of crucial importance to allow the citizen to appraise and endorse the political struggles of parties by striving for hegemony within the heart of the democratic society itself. What this means, in the first place, is that the democratic political institutions take on an insurmountable social commitment to the extent that they are accountable for ensuring that equitable and universal processes of socio-cultural inclusion and individual development are put into effect. Without this fundamental support, these processes begin to be determined in a class-based way or else are alienated from the economic structures and cultural deficits, as well as the power struggles (in their various meanings – political, economic, cultural, religious etc), which are found in the democratic terrain and beyond. In the second place, this means that the social bonds of politics are an essential feature in the democratic constitution of our societies, which, as a result, make politics become a fundamental part of our evolution. In this sense, *the validity and legitimacy* of democratic political institutions are intrinsically bound up with their social commitment, to the degree in which *this social commitment* is fulfilled in every social strata. In my view, this is why social politics has been so closely attached to the politico-institutional framework of our societies, as well as to a democratic culture of a more general kind, where it has even shaped the theoretical-political activities of almost all the professional political parties: notwithstanding the conservative character of some of them, they undertake certain social commitments for fear of not otherwise being able to achieve political hegemony.

In addition, there seems to almost a general consensus that the problems of socio-economic and cultural integration of our societies, should take place by political means. This is either because *laissez-faire* economics has to some extent been discredited or can be explained by the incapacity of a religious-cultural conception to provide equitable and universal kinds of socialization that can suppress social conflicts arising from the division of political, economic and cultural power. Contemporary democratic societies (with regard to public administration and political parties in their dealings with social movements and citizens’ initiatives) are becoming, par excellence, the place where social problems erupt and lead to a confrontation with the institutions, power relations and private groups that are effectively seeking theoretical-political hegemony. In the final analysis, democratic politics is the place and the instrument employed by the widest range of citizens and social movements in their demands for political justice, social equality and cultural integration. Thus all the social struggles are becoming political conflicts and entail a political struggle that is adapted to the institutions on the basis of regulatory arguments and generalizable interests.

It is in this way that a correct understanding of Western modernization should do justice to democratic politics – that is, by highlighting its essential character as a simple agency for allowing social evolution to take place. In my view, philosophic-political modernity can effectively be characterized as the central feature of politics rather than economics (and of course, religion), in what concerns the course of social evolution. It is here one can

find the meaning of the Welfare State and the importance of social democracy, which are discussed throughout this study. Western modernity is opposed to a liberal-conservative and neo-liberal conception (with restrictive and negative attitudes towards politics and the State and characterized by self-referencing, and a non-political/non-regulatory traits with regard to the economic sphere). In view of this, it sets out from proletarian-socialist movements as much to achieve social and economic cohesion as for positing politics as the central feature of social evolution, (which is subordinated to this same social system and assimilates the economic realm within the province of generalizable interests and regulatory arguments emerging from this same social system). It is still my opinion that it is here that the capitalist Welfare State that is grounded on the social-democrat State model, has much to teach us as a theoretical-political conception of justice in this era of crisis in capitalism when the conservatives have political hegemony (and support a politics of austerity as a solution to the capitalist crisis, as discussed earlier).

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In the three points discussed at the beginning of this Conclusion (the central position of political democracy, the all-powerful State and a politicized civil society, together with an attempt to bring about a reconciliation between capital and labor), one can discern a central framework for the evolution of Western democratic societies. In other words, there is an awareness of the existence of deficits of social integration of an economic nature, as well as lingering tensions which, when taken into account, act as the driving-force behind a social evolution that is not always equitable for everybody. Hence, it is a political democracy that ensures the right conditions to control (albeit not always in an ideal way) unequal socio-cultural and economic relations that are characterized by huge disparities between individuals and social groups. Moreover, they are being eliminated or reduced to the point that they become innocuous in any attempt at determining the status quo. In my understanding, this explains both the growth of the compensatory and interventionist responsibilities of the contemporary State and its positive endorsement by a large number of citizens in general and the electoral vote in particular. Politically a compensatory and interventionist Welfare State has become the core constituent of democracy and a guarantor of its effectiveness. It has become consolidated as a part of the democratic ethos where it is deeply rooted in the hearts of a large number of citizens and in the current democratic culture.

For this reason, in my response to the current socio-economic crisis, I argue that there should be a due recognition of the value of the social democrat project of the Welfare State in the three pillars that underpin it. In opposition to the self-referencing of the economic sphere, (a) its independence with regard to the requirements of reproduction in the social sphere b) its desire to shield itself from political intervention, c) the backing it receives from the forces of conservatism), can be found a kind of social and economic cohesion that is guaranteed by political means, and is the necessary panacea for resolving the contemporary socio-economic crisis. In the first place, this crisis affects the regulatory and existential reproduction of our social world and attempts at integration at the level of globalization. The economy cannot seek to encompass society and restrict the activities of political institutions. On the contrary, as it forms a part of the social sphere, this same economy must be subordinated to the need to promote utilitarian values – or in other words, regulatory arguments and generalizable interests which can make feasible the effective and complete reproduction of this same social realm. For this reason, the resolution of the current socio-economic crisis is a *question of power politics*, undertaken by a powerful and extended State that is sensitive to democratic claims and willing to enter into a

dialogue with social movements and citizens' initiatives. It is planted in social politics and seeks a reconciliation between capital and labor, in so far as it is striving to curb a process of accumulation that is currently rampant. Since democratic politics has become embedded in the Welfare State, it has now become, in this century, an instrument that cannot be abandoned. It is effectively established as the central driving-force of the evolution of our democratic societies, by allowing them, as Habermas suggested long ago, to be enmeshed with systematic reproduction (the economy and administrative power) and the regulatory reproduction of the social world, by fostering the latter at the expense of the former. Neo-liberalism has upset this dependence that the systematic reproduction has on the regulatory reproduction of the social world, in so far as it has revived a self-referential conception of the economy at a time when, for this reason, it is attacking the Welfare State and social rights of citizens in an inflexible way. But a Left that is aware of the importance of both the Welfare State and the social rights of citizenship (as well as the central position of democratic politics), had an insurmountable struggle and key role to play at the beginning of the 21st Century, in its attempt to solve this socio-economic crisis. The idea of the radical reformist which Habermas has supported since his first writings, is a means of intertwining administrative-party politics with the social movements and citizens' initiatives, in the sense that, by means of gradual reforms in all sectors of society, it has effectively established the substantive meaning of a democracy that is inclusive and embraces everyone.

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(Submitted on February 2014)

(Resubmitted on August 2014)

(Approved for publication on July 2014)

To Cite this Article

DANNER, Leno Francisco. Habermas and the Idea of Radical Reformism: Political Justice in the Era of Post-Socialism and the Crisis of Capitalism. **Revista Estudos Políticos**: online journal published twice a year by the Laboratory for the Hum(e)an Studies (Laboratório de Estudos Hum(e)anos, Fluminense Federal University, Brazil), and the Center for the Study of Political Theory (Núcleo de Estudos em Teoria Política, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). Rio de Janeiro, Vol.5, N.1, pp. 170 – 190, December 2014. At: <http://revistaestudospoliticos.com/>

Notes

1. Cf., ainda: Wellmer, 2001: 99.
2. Cf., ainda: Maccarthy, 2001: 298-299; Honneth, 2007: 129-148.
3. Cf., ainda: Wellmer, 2001: 69-72.
4. Cf., ainda: Honneth & Hartmann, 2009: 412-419.
5. Cf., ainda: Goode, 2005: 133-141.
6. *Die Zeit* de 08/12/1989.
7. Cf., ainda: Habermas, 2000: 93-94.

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